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Debt and domestic violence are connected in ways not previously imagined. A 
new type of debt—which I have labeled “coerced debt”—is emerging from abusive 
relationships. Coerced debt occurs when the abuser in a violent relationship obtains 
credit in the victim’s name via fraud or coercion. It ranges from secretly taking out 
credit cards in victims’ names to coercing victims into signing loan documents to 
tricking victims into relinquishing their rights to the family home. As wide ranging 
as these tactics can be, one consequence consistently emerges: ruined credit ratings. 
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Coerced debt wreaks havoc on credit scores, which is particularly problematic 
because the use of credit reports is no longer confined to traditional lenders. Em-
ployers, landlords, and utility companies all make extensive use of credit scores 
when screening potential customers. Thus, a credit score that has been damaged by 
coerced debt can make it prohibitively difficult for victims to obtain employment, 
housing, or basic utilities—all of which are requirements for establishing an 
independent household. 
In this Article, I propose amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act to allow vic-
tims of coerced debt to repair their credit reports. My proposal would enable family 
courts to rule on whether alleged coerced debt is, in fact, coerced. The victim could 
then submit the court’s certification to the credit reporting agencies, which would 
block the coerced debt from her credit report to the extent that the block did not 
unduly harm her creditors. My proposal would build a bridge between the deci-
sionmakers already determining issues related to coerced debt and the credit reports 
that victims need to have reformed in order to move beyond the abuse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Debt and domestic violence are connected in ways not previously imag-
ined. A new type of debt—which I have labeled “coerced debt”—is emerg-
ing from abusive relationships.1 Coerced debt occurs when the abuser in a 
violent relationship obtains credit in the victim’s name via fraud or duress. 
This is a new problem, one enabled by the tremendous growth of consumer 
credit markets in recent decades and by the corresponding depersonalization 
of the credit system.2 In a previous article, I provided the first published 
account of coerced debt.3 Although my work was preliminary and further 
study is needed to determine coerced debt’s scope and severity, my research 
provides enough evidence to suggest that it is a real problem with a signifi-
cant impact on its victims.4  
Coerced debt is a complex phenomenon with multiple facets and no easy 
solutions. My research revealed that batterers engage in an extensive array 
of damaging credit transactions, including secretly taking out credit cards in 
victims’ names, coercing victims into signing loan documents, and tricking 
victims into relinquishing their rights to the family home, among many 
others.5 As wide-ranging as these tactics can be, one consequence consist-
ently emerges: ruined credit ratings.6  
Thus, in this Article, I propose amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA)7 to enable victims of coerced debt to repair their credit reports. 
My proposal would allow family courts handling the divorces of abusive 
 
1 See Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 951, 954-55 (2012) (surveying professionals who work with victims and survivors 
of domestic abuse who had been coerced into debt). 
2 See, e.g., id. at 986-87 (detailing banks’ transition from face-to-face lending to the mass 
mailing of credit cards). 
3 See id. at 959-72. There are no other academic articles on coerced debt, and there do not 
appear to be any articles on coerced debt in the popular media either. See id. at 959-60 (noting 
that “research on coerced debt is almost nonexistent”). The one organization that has reported on 
this problem is the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), which has developed advocacy 
materials on the consumer rights of domestic violence survivors. See Domestic Violence Survivors, 
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., http://www.nclc.org/special-projects/domestic-violence-survivors. 
html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (offering various resources to address the “serious financial 
concerns” that confront survivors of domestic violence). 
4 Littwin, supra note 1, at 959-72. 
5 Id. at 986-91. 
6 See id. at 997 (noting that victims often do not discover their coerced debt until it is delin-
quent). 
7 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006). 
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marriages to rule on whether alleged coerced debt is, in fact, coerced. The 
victim could then submit the court’s certification to credit reporting 
agencies (CRAs), which would block the reporting of coerced debt to the 
extent that this would not unduly harm future creditors. The family court’s 
decision would not affect a domestic violence victim’s underlying liability 
for the coerced debt,8 but it would enable her to move forward with a credit 
report that better reflected her risk profile.  
The most important limitation of my proposal is that it applies only to 
victims who are divorcing their abusers. It does not help unmarried victims 
or those who do not have the means to obtain a divorce. These populations 
will require separate remedies, which I will propose after further empirical 
study. This Article explores one part of the problem and one possible 
solution.9 
*      *      * 
Coerced debt wreaks havoc on credit scores.10 Victims of coerced debt 
often do not discover the debt until they attempt to leave an abusive 
relationship, when much of the debt is delinquent or in danger of becoming 
so.11 Delinquency occurs in several situations: when the debt is still out-
standing; when the abuser has already repaid the debt, but only after it was 
in default, thus leaving a negative mark on the victim’s credit report; or 
when the debt is so large that the victim is unable to pay it in a timely 
manner.12 All of these scenarios can mar a victim’s credit rating at precisely 
the point when she most needs a clean bill of credit health.13 
The situation would not be as problematic if credit reports were used 
only by traditional lenders. The more significant issue is that employers, 
landlords, and utility companies make extensive use of credit scores in 
 
8 Liability for coerced debt—as well as preventive measures that could reduce its incidence—
are issues that I plan to explore in future research. I am delaying their consideration until after I 
have gathered more definitive empirical data for two primary reasons. First, policy solutions that 
remove liability altogether would almost certainly increase costs for creditors more than the 
proposal I make in this Article and thus would have correspondingly greater chances of increasing 
the cost of credit. Second, coerced debt is so complex that it is especially important to analyze 
thoroughly the potential unintended consequences of any policy proposals, which is difficult to do 
with preliminary data. 
9 The question of whether to give family courts jurisdiction over the financial affairs of un-
married couples is an interesting one that will benefit from future study. 
10 See Littwin, supra note 1, at 1001 (noting that advocates for victims of coerced debt “over-
whelmingly reported damage to their clients’ credit scores”). 
11 In my earlier study, several divorce lawyers stated that most of their clients were unaware 
of the coerced debt in their names until their lawyers ran credit checks. Id. at 997-98.  
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., id. at 998 (relating the story of one victim who did not know of the loans in her 
name until she attempted to take out student loans). 
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screening potential employees, tenants, and customers.14 Thus, a credit 
score that has been damaged by coerced debt can make it prohibitively 
difficult for victims to obtain employment, housing, or basic utilities, all of 
which are requirements for establishing an independent household.15 
The lawyers and other advocates I interviewed for the coerced debt 
study reported that credit ratings tarnished by coerced debt resulted in 
longer shelter stays, victims returning to their abusers, or victims making 
financial calculations that resulted in them not leaving their abusers in the 
first place.16 In other words, the relationship between coerced debt and bad 
credit may be an important link in the chain that binds many abusive 
relationships.  
One major challenge in crafting policy solutions to fix the credit reports 
of coerced debt victims is that the process of repairing credit reports is 
generally ineffective. Even consumers with less complicated problems than 
coerced debt face significant hurdles when attempting to fix their credit 
reports.17 This is because the CRAs that collect and distribute consumer 
credit data use a dispute-resolution process that is deeply flawed. The CRA 
system for investigating alleged errors is almost entirely automated, provid-
ing no meaningful review of consumer disputes.18 Consumer claims of 
errors are processed through a series of mechanized steps in which no 
decisionmaker ever actually evaluates the dispute on its merits. To make 
matters worse, the CRAs essentially keep two sets of books.19 The credit 
reports provided to consumers do not completely match the reports that 
potential creditors see—and neither do the credit scores. The CRAs use two 
sets of algorithms when generating reports and scores for these two audi-
ences.20 
Because the CRAs have been so ineffective at resolving comparatively 
simple consumer disputes, I largely bypass them in my remedy for the more 
 
14 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
15 Littwin, supra note 1, at 1001-02. 
16 Id. at 1002-03. Empirical research bears out these professionals’ intuition that financial 
factors play an important role in a woman’s ability to leave an abusive relationship. See Deborah 
K. Anderson & Daniel G. Saunders, Leaving an Abusive Partner: An Empirical Review of Predictors, 
the Process of Leaving, and Psychological Well-Being, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 163, 171 
(2003) (concluding that “[i]ncome variables were not only among the most consistently related but 
possibly the most powerful predictors of the stay/leave decision overall, even when controlling for 
a variety of psychological and other variables”). 
17 See infra subsection III.A.2. See generally Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice, 14 N.C. BANK-
ING INST. 139 (2010) (collecting narratives of the hurdles that consumers must jump over to fix 
their credit reports). 
18 See infra subsection III.A.2. 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 120-28. 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 120-28. 
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complex problem of coerced debt. My proposal takes an alternate approach 
and leverages the fact that a segment of coerced debt victims already 
encounters a decisionmaker with financial expertise and extensive 
knowledge of both parties to the credit abuse: the judges who handle their 
divorces. Family courts examine a family’s finances in great detail, engaging 
in decisions that we think of as the province of bankruptcy and other 
financial courts.21 Divorce courts also make decisions about the most 
intimate details of family life, assigning custody and in some states assign-
ing fault for the divorce itself.22 Thus, they are ideally positioned to exam-
ine a matter that is at once financial and deeply personal.  
Although family courts regularly divide divorcing families’ assets and 
debts, their distribution of debt between two ex-spouses is not binding on a 
family’s creditors. Creditors are not part of the divorce proceedings, so their 
rights continue to be governed by their contracts with individual or multi-
ple family members. If a family court decrees that a debt in Spouse A’s 
name should be the responsibility of Spouse B, that gives Spouse A a claim 
against Spouse B for the amount of the debt,23 but it does not change 
Spouse A’s contract with the creditor. If a family has assets, the court can 
achieve a meaningful distribution of debt by awarding Spouse A enough 
assets to compensate for the debt, but many divorcing families do not have 
significant assets.24 
Thus, family courts have limited power to change the distribution of 
debt between spouses upon divorce. A proposal to give family courts such 
authority would be an immense change that would require a significantly 
greater empirical understanding of coerced debt. However, a system in 
 
21 See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 109 
S.W.3d 258, 271-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (reviewing in detail a trial court’s valuation of a couple’s 
assets). 
22 See, e.g., Dodson v. Dodson, 904 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (placing fault on the 
husband). 
23 Nothing in my proposal would prevent family courts from continuing to allocate debt this 
way. Although redistributing a couple’s debt has little practical effect on most consumers, some 
victims of coerced debt may have the resources to sue their abusers. In addition, it may be 
particularly important for family courts in coerced debt cases to make specific findings that the 
abuser incurred the debt via duress or fraud. Otherwise, a creditor that later sues a victim may try 
to argue that the certification of coerced debt validates the debt’s existence and estops the victim 
from asserting claims of duress or fraud. 
24 Divorce is frequently associated with negative financial outcomes. For example, a recent 
Census survey found that children living with parents who had divorced within the previous year 
were more likely to be living in poverty (28%) than other children (19%). DIANA B. ELLIOTT & 
TAVIA SIMMONS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL EVENTS OF AMERICANS: 2009, AT 12 
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs-13.pdf. 
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which a family court could certify that certain debts were coerced for 
purposes of adjusting a victim’s credit report is more feasible.  
Under such a system, a victim of domestic violence could submit a claim 
during her divorce that some or all of the debt in her name (or in both 
spouses’ names) was acquired without her knowledge or consent. The judge 
would then rule on the coerced status of each debt, just as she would on an 
allegation that one spouse was entitled to certain property. A victim who 
successfully obtained a certification of coerced debt could then submit the 
court document to the CRAs, where it would have two effects. 
The first effect would be that any debt deemed coerced and that was no 
longer outstanding would simply be blocked from the victim’s credit report. 
The goal here is to prevent negative payment history about previous 
coerced debt from painting the victim as a worse credit risk than she 
actually is. Creditors value information about payment history on past debt 
because of its predictive power. In this Article, I label this a creditor’s 
“predictive interest” in access to credit data. Creditors believe that consum-
ers’ payment tendencies remain relatively stable over time, so that a con-
sumer who paid promptly in the past is likely to pay promptly in the 
future.25 But this predictive power is reduced when the consumer did not 
acquire the debt voluntarily and may not have been the person managing its 
payment. As a result, the creditor’s interest in obtaining that information is 
significantly diminished.26 
Blocking credit data about past coerced debt would have a major impact 
on victims’ credit ratings. Although the CRAs’ credit-scoring algorithms are 
proprietary,27 it is likely that payment history heavily influences credit 
scores. According to FICO, a major provider of credit scores, payment 
history is the most important element of a consumer’s credit record, 
comprising 35% of the total, superseding even the amount of debt the 
consumer currently has outstanding.28 
 
25 See, e.g., About PLUS Score, EXPERIAN, http://www.protectmyid.com/Message.aspx?Page 
TypeID=AboutPlusScore&SiteVersionID=815&SiteID=100302&sc=668893&bcd= (last visited Nov. 
16, 2012) (“Higher scores represent a greater likelihood that you’ll pay back your debts so you are 
viewed as being a lower credit risk to lenders. A lower score indicates to lenders that you may be a 
higher credit risk.”). 
26 See infra Section III.A. 
27 See JOHN HOWAT, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FULL UTILITY CREDIT REPORT-
ING: RISKS TO LOW INCOME CONSUMERS 8 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/ 
pdf/credit_reports/credit_reports_full_utility_dec2009.pdf (noting criticism against CRAs for the 
proprietary nature of credit score calculation formulae). 
28 What’s in My FICO Score, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/whatsinyour 
score.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
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However, data on outstanding debt are still very important to credi-
tors.29 Without it, a potential creditor cannot assess the claims on a con-
sumer’s income and assets to determine how many other creditors it will 
compete with each month for payment or to evaluate these other creditors’ 
collection rights in the event of a default. I refer to this as a creditor’s 
“current liabilities” interest in a consumer’s credit report. Creditors have a 
current liabilities interest in data about all of a consumer’s outstanding 
debts, even those not acquired voluntarily. Thus, I limit my proposal for a 
complete block of coerced debt to debts that have already been paid off or 
are no longer legally binding for other reasons.30 Even though a victim of 
coerced debt was not bound consensually to her coerced liabilities, potential 
creditors nevertheless need access to information about them if she is bound 
legally. 
There are, however, competing concerns. Certain users of credit re-
ports—namely employers, landlords, and basic utility companies31—provide 
services and benefits that are so essential to recently divorced victims of 
domestic violence that, on balance, victims’ needs outweigh the current 
liabilities interest of such providers.32 Thus, the second effect of submitting 
the coerced debt certification would be that potential employers, landlords, 
and basic utility companies would have no access to data about coerced 
debt, regardless of whether the debt was still outstanding. The equities for 
these entities balance differently than for traditional lenders. A victim of 
domestic violence leaving an abusive relationship and starting an independ-
ent household can live without a credit card or a mortgage. But without a 
job, rental housing, or gas and electricity, she is simply not an economically 
viable unit. 
In addition, the equities on the other side of the transaction balance dif-
ferently as well. Employers, landlords, and utilities have different expecta-
tions when entering an economic relationship than professional lenders do. 
Employers are the easiest case since they are not creditors at all.33 Their 
interest in a potential employee’s credit report is in the possible relationship 
 
29 Outstanding debt comprises 30% of a FICO score. Id.  
30 These reasons include expiration of the statute of limitations or discharge in bankruptcy. 
31 Insurers also use credit report data. E.g., Allstate’s Use of Credit Information to Evaluate In-
surance Policies, ALLSTATE, http://www.allstate.com/about/credit.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
However, the advocates I interviewed for my preliminary study did not mention insurance as a 
major concern, so I have not included an analysis of it in this Article. This is a topic I will explore 
in future empirical research on coerced debt. 
32 See infra subsection III.B.2.  
33 In fact, employers are debtors of their employees because wages are not paid until some 
period after they have been earned. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006) (providing bankruptcy 
priority for employees of debtors).  
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between a negative credit history and certain negative job-performance 
traits.34 But for a judicially certified victim of coerced debt, the negative 
credit history is not of her own making and thus much less relevant to her 
future job performance. 
Landlords and utilities are, in fact, creditors, but their regulatory treat-
ment in all other areas of law is so different than that of lenders that it is 
reasonable to treat them differently in this case as well.35 Landlords and 
utilities are regulated heavily in recognition of the essential services they 
provide, which is exactly why I propose blocking their access to information 
about outstanding certified coerced debts. These two types of creditors also 
compensate for risk differently than financial-sector creditors, and their risk 
management strategies make them less likely than lenders to suffer economic 
harm due to a coerced debt block.36 
In addition, preliminary empirical evidence37 and logic suggest that fi-
nancially struggling households are likely to pay their rent and utility bills 
before paying down general unsecured debt.38 Credit card issuers, in fact, 
encourage the deferral of substantive debt payment by emphasizing the 
minimum-payment option.39 Plus, a consumer may be especially likely to 
prioritize rental and utility payments over outstanding coerced debt because 
she may not consider herself morally responsible for the latter. 
My proposal could be implemented by amending the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act or by promulgating new regulations under the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA).40 My ideas build on a current FCRA provision 
that allows consumers who have obtained police reports verifying their 
identity thefts to compel the CRAs to block records of these transactions 
from their credit reports.41 The relative success of this blocking mechanism 
demonstrates that it is possible to provide consumers with an effective 
 
34 This relationship is controversial. For a detailed discussion, see infra subsection III.B.2. 
35 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
36 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
37 See, e.g., Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among 
Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV 451, 458 n.20 (2008) (discussing how many financially 
struggling households triage certain bills, paying them late or negotiating for later payment dates, 
in order to pay other bills, including rent, on time). 
38 Even if a coerced debt was secured originally, it is unlikely to be relevantly secured from 
the victim’s point of view because it will often be for a home in which she no longer lives or a car 
to which she no longer has access.  
39 See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 375, 387-88 (describing how a 2003 regulator-mandated increase in minimum payments 
disrupted many credit card issuers’ business models).  
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2006). 
41 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a). 
  
372 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 363 
 
error-reduction process within the current system, as long as the remedy 
incorporates a non-CRA decisionmaker and eliminates CRA discretion.42 
In its current form, however, the FCRA provision excludes many claims 
of coerced debt,43 despite the fact that, in many ways, coerced debt is a form 
of identity theft.44 In addition, law enforcement officers are not the ideal 
decisionmakers for coerced debt claims. My proposal would broaden the 
definition of identity theft in coercion cases and replace law enforcement 
officers with family courts as the decisionmakers. 
Alternatively, implementation could occur under the ECOA. The 
ECOA regulations already contain a provision that can be read to cover 
coerced debt.45 I propose amending this regulation to make it clear that 
coerced debt is included and to make the regulation easier for consumers to 
use.46 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I situates coerced debt within 
the domestic violence literature and briefly reviews the evidence of the 
phenomenon. Part II describes the current, ineffective process the CRAs 
use to resolve consumer credit-report disputes and argues that leveraging 
the competencies of family courts could improve this process for victims of 
coerced debt. Part III considers my policy proposal, explaining its applica-
tion to traditional lenders as well as to employers, landlords, and utility 
companies. 
I. COERCIVE CONTROL AND COERCED DEBT 
In a recent article, I documented the current evidence for coerced debt, 
which I defined to include “all non-consensual, credit-related transactions 
that occur in a violent relationship.”47 I presented a preliminary empirical 
study in which I interviewed fifty-five lawyers and other advocates who 
worked with victims of domestic violence about their clients’ credit prob-
lems. Although a wide variety of credit difficulties emerged—ranging from 
the scarcity problems common to people living in poverty to mistakes made 
because of financial illiteracy—the overarching theme that emerged was 
 
42 See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra subsection III.B.1. 
44 See infra Section II.B. 
45 See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(ii) (2012) (“[I]n evaluating an applicant’s creditworthiness a 
creditor shall consider . . . any information the applicant may present that tends to indicate the 
credit history being considered by the creditor does not accurately reflect the applicant’s 
creditworthiness.”). 
46 See infra subsection II.C.3. 
47 Littwin, supra note 1, at 954.  
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coerced debt.48 This Part contextualizes coerced debt within the broader 
framework of domestic violence and briefly summarizes the evidence from 
my preliminary study. 
Coerced debt appears to be part of a broader pattern of abuse that occurs 
within one type of abusive intimate relationships.49 Recent empirical work 
suggests that there are two major kinds of domestic abuse: (1) common 
couple violence, in which both parties engage in violence as a problem-
solving strategy50; and (2) coercive control, in which the abuser asserts 
complete dominance over the victim, essentially seeking to undermine the 
victim’s free will.51 According to current research, this dominance is typical-
ly established by the abuser’s implementation of “regulations” that govern 
every aspect of the victim’s behavior and are enforced by frequent and 
severe violence.52 
Three examples from the leading work on this type of abuse, Evan 
Stark’s Coercive Control, illustrate this phenomenon. Professor Stark, a 
therapist, documents coercive control with both empirical research and 
anecdotal evidence from his own practice.53 In one such anecdote, the 
abusive husband required his wife to record her daily activities in fifteen-
minute increments and then violently interrogated her about her activity 
log every night.54 In another case, the husband required his wife to wear 
thin, cotton saris at all times.55 Because they lived in a cold climate, this 
essentially restricted her to the house for much of the year. In the third 
example, the abuser confined his wife in their bedroom suite whenever he 
 
48 See id. at 958 (describing research documenting coerced debt). 
49 I recently applied to the National Science Foundation for funding for a study that would, 
inter alia, test this hypothesis. I am collaborating in this work with Adrienne Adams, a psycholo-
gist at Michigan State University. 
50 See Michael P. Johnson, Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic 
Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1003, 1006 (2006) (identifying “situational couple 
violence” as a type of domestic relationship in which both parties may use violence and neither 
party is controlling); Michael P. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two 
Forms of Violence Against Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283, 284-85 (1995) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism] (differentiating common couple violence from one-sided, control-
oriented abuse). 
51 See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL 257-63 (2007) (stating that controlling partners 
view relationships as “zero-sum” games in which the controlled partner’s independence should be 
eliminated); Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra note 50, at 284 (defining one-sided abuse that 
involves controlling behaviors as “patriarchal terrorism”). 
52 See STARK, supra note 51, at 228-88 (documenting the various methods by which abusers 
exercise control). 
53 See id. at 4 (listing Professor Stark’s professional roles, in which he gathered the examples 
he uses in the book). 
54 Id. at 294-95. 
55 Id. at 239. 
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left home.56 It is within this type of control-oriented relationships that 
coerced debt can exist.57 
Research has also begun to document the role that economic tactics play 
in coercive control. These tactics fall into two broad categories: preventing 
victims from earning money and controlling their access to money the 
family has earned. In the first category, some abusers forbid victims from 
working outside the home.58 Others interfere with victims’ employment 
through tactics such as inflicting visible injuries,59 hiding their work 
clothes,60 or harassing their coworkers or bosses.61 
Coerced debt falls within the second category of economic abuse: the 
establishment of control over household finances. Financial control is often 
seized using abusive methods, such as preventing the victim’s access to joint 
bank accounts; forcing the victim to deposit income into accounts controlled 
solely by the abuser; putting the victim on an allowance; and preventing the 
victim from accessing financial information—both about her household’s 
finances and about personal finances generally.62 My preliminary research 
suggests that financial control can have some striking results: wives who do 
not know their husbands’ incomes, their husbands’ occupations, or whether 
their families’ residences are rented or owned.63 This control—the ability to 
limit the victims’ access to knowledge of the household’s finances—is the 
 
56 Id. at 268. 
57 See Littwin, supra note 1, at 981-86 (viewing financial control as the foundation on which 
coerced debt can develop). 
58 See Rudy J. Aguilar & Narina Nunez Nightingale, The Impact of Specific Battering Experiences 
on the Self-Esteem of Abused Women, 9 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 35, 40 (1994) (categorizing prevention 
of working as a type of emotional/controlling abuse); Mary P. Brewster, Power and Control 
Dynamics in Prestalking and Stalking Situations, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 207, 210 (2003) (listing a 
prohibition on working outside the home as one type of financial control); see also Susan Lloyd, 
The Effects of Domestic Violence on Women’s Employment, 19 LAW & POL’Y 139, 150-51 tbls.3 & 4 
(1997) (documenting the frequency with which partners restricted access to money or made 
working outside the home difficult). 
59 E.g., Angela M. Moe & Myrtle P. Bell, Abject Economics: The Effects of Battering and Vio-
lence on Women’s Work and Employability, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 29, 40 (2004) (docu-
menting one woman’s difficulty keeping a job because she missed work due to frequent injuries).  
60 E.g., Ruth A. Brandwein & Diana M. Filiano, Toward Real Welfare Reform: The Voices of 
Battered Women, 15 AFFLIA 224, 233 (2000). 
61 See, e.g., id. (recounting how some women leave their jobs out of fear of what their hus-
bands would do to their employers); Melanie Shepard & Ellen Pence, The Effect of Battering on the 
Employment Status of Women, AFFLIA, Summer 1988, at 55, 58 (reporting that 24% of victims 
claimed that abuse led, in part, to a loss of employment). 
62 See Littwin, supra note 1, at 981-86. 
63 Id. at 985-86. 
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foundation that underlies coerced debt,64 enabling abusers to perpetuate 
long-term financial fraud and coercion. 
There appear to be limitless tactics by which abusers generate coerced 
debt. These include applying for credit cards in a partner’s name without 
the partner’s knowledge; using physical duress to force a partner to apply 
for credit cards; threatening violence against the partner or her children 
toward the same end; forging a partner’s signature on home mortgage 
documentation to, for example, withdraw equity from the family home; 
employing a combination of fraud and force to induce a partner to sign a 
quitclaim deed for the family home; arranging the household’s secured 
transactions so that the debt is in the victim’s name while the collateral asset 
is in the abuser’s; and impersonating a partner to obtain a car loan.65 
I include within the term “coerced debt” behavior that falls under the 
traditional legal definition of fraud66 as well as behavior more properly 
characterized as duress.67 The role duress plays in coerced debt is easy to 
see. If an abuser holds a gun to a victim’s head and instructs her to fill out a 
credit application, that is clearly coercive. But in relationships permeated 
with coercive control, fraud also plays a role in coerced debt. For example, 
an abuser might hold a gun to a victim’s head and instruct her to sign a loan 
application without permitting her to read it. Alternatively, an abuser might 
borrow in the victim’s name without her knowledge. When she discovers 
the debt and asks the abuser about it, he might then put the gun to her head 
and instruct her to leave it alone. A third possibility is that the victim 
discovers the debt but is too afraid to ask the abuser about it. In all of these 
hypothetical situations, the abuser sustains the fraud by using elements of 
duress. Even in cases without direct financial coercion, much fraud in 
abusive relationships likely evades detection through other abusive tactics, 
such as controlling the victim’s access to financial records, stealing the 
victim’s mail, or monitoring the victim’s telephone calls.68 
The advocates I interviewed explained that batterers engaged in this 
behavior partly to gain economic enrichment, but also to maintain control 
within the abusive relationship. Several of my interviewees noted that, in 
many of these cases, abusers intended to limit their victims’ options and 
 
64 Id. at 981-86. 
65 See id. at 986-97. 
66 “A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce 
another to act to his or her detriment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009). 
67 “Broadly, a threat of harm made to compel a person to do something against his or her will 
or judgment . . . .” Id. at 578. 
68 Littwin, supra note 1, at 973-78. 
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make it more difficult for them to leave.69 A victim’s inability to start an 
economically viable household on her own creates a major barrier to leav-
ing. As one psychologist I interviewed stated, the abuser’s objective is “to 
keep [the victim] from having alternatives to the relationship.”70 
To be fair, only the most sophisticated batterers probably thought of 
financial abuse in terms of negative credit ratings. Their immediate con-
cerns may have been issues such as keeping victims financially illiterate and 
arranging their families’ affairs so that all of the assets are in their names 
and the debts in the names of their victims.71 Victims would have difficulty 
leaving the relationship because they would be financially naïve and would 
owe hundreds or thousands of dollars in unanticipated debt. 
But my research suggests that credit reporting is, indeed, a major barrier 
to leaving and remaining free of abusive relationships. Many of the lawyers 
and other advocates I interviewed discussed credit reporting and its conse-
quences as barriers for victims.72 As I reported previously: 
[O]ne lawyer who staffs a family law hotline stated, “My major concern is 
her credit report.” Another said, “Oh yeah, that’s really common. There’s 
no good way around it.” Other advocates said that it “absolutely” was an 
issue and that they see it “over and over again” or “all the time.” One social 
worker stated that her clients’ credit ratings were ruined “almost across the 
board.”73 
My interviewees described how these poor credit ratings directly inter-
fered with victims’ attempts to establish self-sufficiency. More than a dozen 
reported that negative credit scores prevented their clients from obtaining 
housing, employment, and basic utilities.74 One legal clinical professor 
characterized the intersection of coerced debt with landlord and employer 
use of credit reports as “really hurt[ing] DV survivors.”75  
Several of the lawyers and other advocates I interviewed stated that the 
inability to obtain employment and housing resulted in longer shelter 
stays.76 One lay advocate explained, “Often the emotional crisis issues and 
physical safety issues are in better shape after 30-90 days. But then she’s left 
 
69 Id. at 999.  
70 Id. (alteration in original). 
71 See id. at 961 tbl.1 (listing several methods of establishing coerced debt). 
72 Id. at 998. 
73 Id. at 1001 (footnotes omitted). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1002 (attributing overcrowding in domestic violence (DV) shelters in part to victims’ 
inability to find housing on account of their poor credit scores). 
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living in this shelter situation longer than she needs it. Nobody will rent to 
her and her children, and nobody will open utilities in her name.”77 
Of even greater concern is the fact that, according to several advocates, 
bad credit is a major reason why many victims remain in abusive relation-
ships.78 They made statements such as, “[H]aving a bad credit score . . . 
creates even more barriers to her being able to successfully extract herself 
from that relationship;” and, “If there were options for women getting their 
credit back, I think it would go a long way toward helping” them leave.79 
The following Parts explore one such option.  
II. WHO DECIDES? CREDIT REPORTING’S  
DECISIONMAKING DEFICIT 
On close examination, the most striking feature of our credit reporting 
system is the absence of a decisionmaker at the heart of the process. Although 
credit reports play a crucial role in consumers’ financial lives, the system is 
so automated that no person has the authority to decide exactly which 
pieces of information belong in an individual consumer’s report.80 
In 2003, Congress decided that this automation was unacceptable with 
respect to identity theft and enacted the Fair and Accurate Credit Trans-
actions Act (FACTA)81 as an amendment to the FCRA. The new congres-
sionally mandated system is still semiautomated, but it provides for some 
decisionmaking authority by relying on law enforcement agencies to 
screen claims of identity theft.82 In the area of coerced debt, however, law 
enforcement authorities are unsuited for their roles as de facto deci-
sionmakers.83 Thus, my proposal builds upon the identity theft procedure 
but designates family court as the appropriate decisionmaking forum. 
The CRAs do, of course, have rules that determine how data are selected 
for inclusion in credit reports; beyond these parameters, however, the 
system is fully automated.84 The CRAs use computer programs to process 
 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1002-03. 
79 Id. at 1002. 
80 See generally Wu, supra note 17 (providing an overview of the credit reporting system and 
detailing the failings of its credit dispute process). 
81 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 20 U.S.C.). 
82 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(e) (2006). 
83 See infra text accompanying notes 196-99.  
84 See generally Wu, supra note 17.  
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information from current creditors and other furnishers85 and repackage it 
for viewing by consumers and future creditors—all without any human 
supervision over the generated content.86  
Given the massive amounts of data that circulate in our consumer credit 
system,87 this is a reasonable, and indeed necessary, way for the process to 
begin. But two problems emerge. First, the rules used by the CRAs for 
selecting data for inclusion on credit reports virtually guarantee that there 
will be a high error rate.88 Second, no decisionmaker has authority to review 
and fix credit reports in which errors are found. The CRA internal error 
investigation process relies on a combination of automated computer 
processes and low-level employees lacking discretion. The absence of a 
decisionmaker means no authority exists to which victims of coerced debt 
can appeal to argue that fraudulent or duress-generated debt should be 
excluded from their credit reports.89 
FACTA improved the process by adding a procedure that enables vic-
tims of identity theft to correct their credit reports by blocking fraudulent 
data.90 This process has been unavailing for many victims of coerced debt, 
even though coerced debt is in part a form of identity theft. Nevertheless, 
the blocking provision lays the groundwork upon which I build my pro-
posal. It demonstrates successful intervention in a system as mechanized as 
credit reporting. I would broaden the statute to include all forms of coerced 
debt and substitute a decisionmaker with better institutional capacity for 
reviewing coerced debt allegations. 
The FCRA essentially deputizes law enforcement authorities to deter-
mine whether identity theft has occurred,91 but law enforcement agencies 
lack the expertise in finances or family relations to handle coerced debt. 
 
85 Furnishers are entities that report consumer financial behavior to the CRAs. The term 
includes past creditors and public records keepers. FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FAIR 
CREDIT REPORTING ACT DISPUTE PROCESS 4 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 FTC REPORT], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/fcradispute/P044808fcradisputeprocessreporttocongress. 
pdf (listing examples of entities considered “furnishers”). 
86 See id. at 150-53 (documenting CRAs’ reliance on furnisher-provided information). 
87 A few brief statistics about credit cards illustrate the scope of the consumer credit system 
in the United States. As of 2009, there were 156 million credit card holders and over 1.2 billion 
credit cards. That year, credit card purchases totaled $1.94 trillion and the outstanding credit card 
debt reached $886 billion. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: 2012, at 740 tbl.1188 (131st ed. 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/ 
statab/2012/tables/12s1188.pdf. 
88 See infra subsection II.A.1. 
89 See infra subsection II.A.2. 
90 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2 (2006). 
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(q)(4) (requiring an identity theft report to be filed with the appro-
priate law enforcement agency). 
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Family courts, on the other hand, are equipped to adjudicate complex 
transactions that occur among family members. Indeed, they already make 
determinations about both domestic violence and family finances,92 and, in 
doing so, consider an issue closely related to coerced debt. In the states that 
allow courts to balance the equities of the case when distributing assets and 
debts,93 many judges consider whether domestic violence has occurred.94 
The only difference is that family courts’ current debt distributions have no 
effect on credit reports. My proposal would build a bridge between those 
already making difficult determinations about issues related to coerced debt 
and the reformation of credit reports victims need in order to move beyond 
the abuse. 
A. The Credit Reporting Agencies’ Failings 
The CRAs have done such a poor job of producing accurate credit reports 
that they cannot be trusted with the complex and sensitive matter of 
coerced debt. Many of the errors plaguing credit reports are consequences 
not of any type of fraud, but rather of the standard CRA system for gener-
ating reports. The CRAs have equally inadequate procedures for rectifying 
mistakes, which indicates that they do not have the capacity to make 
decisions about errors resulting from coerced debt. 
1. Inaccurate Credit Reporting 
It is virtually indisputable that consumer credit reports contain a large 
number of errors. As Professor Lynn LoPucki wrote in 2001, “The number 
of errors in the system are acceptable from the standpoint of lending 
creditors, but generally appalling from the standpoint of the individual 
consumer.”95 In 2009, more than eleven million consumers experienced 
some form of identity theft.96 That number does not include additional 
 
92 See infra subsection II.C.1. 
93 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171 (West 2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502 
(2008) (allowing the equitable division of marital property in an action for divorce); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 7.001 (West 2006) (“[T]he court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in 
a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and 
any children of the marriage.”). 
94 See infra note 225. 
95 Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 89, 102 (2001). 
96 CHI CHI WU & ELIZABETH DE ARMOND, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR 
CREDIT REPORTING § 9.1 (7th ed. 2010).  
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errors introduced by the CRAs who collect credit data and the furnishers 
who provide them.97  
A brief sampling of statistics indicates the magnitude of the problem. 
Four small-scale studies yielded credit report error percentages ranging 
from 31%98 to 53%99 to 70%100 to 79%.101 Three of these studies also reported 
the percentage of credit reports containing errors significant enough to 
result in a denial of credit. These serious-error rates ranged from 12%102 to 
25%103 to 29%.104 Moreover, all of these studies used credit reports ordered 
by consumers, which, as explained below, are more likely to be accurate 
than the ones produced for lenders and other users of credit data.105 A 2002 
study of credit reports generated by mortgage applications found that 10% 
contained one specific error: data from at least one additional consumer.106  
A 2005 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found 
that 18% of surveyed consumers had filed a dispute about their credit 
reports at some point.107 Even a report to the FTC by the Consumer Data 
Industry Association (CDIA), the CRAs’ trade association, found that 
21.8% of consumers who ordered their credit reports in 2003 filed a dispute 
that led to an investigation by a CRA.108 More startling is the statistic that, 
 
97 See id. at 121-22 (detailing how CRA credit files are built and how errors arise). 
98 See FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND ACCU-
RATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003, at 7 tbl.2 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 FTC 
REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/12/P044804factarptcongress.pdf (studying the 
reports of 128 consumers, although possible overrepresentation of higher-income, higher-score 
participants could have resulted in an underreporting of errors).  
99 See L. DOUGLAS SMITH ET AL., PROCESSES FOR DETERMINING ACCURACY OF CREDIT 
BUREAU INFORMATION 14 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/FACTACT/FACT 
_Act_Report_2006_Exhibits_1-12.pdf (reporting on a preliminary study of thirty consumers 
conducted for the FTC’s 2006 Report to Congress). 
100 See JON GOLINGER WITH EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: CRED-
IT REPORT ERRORS MEAN CONSUMERS LOSE 7 (1998), available at http://cdn.publicinterestnet 
work.org/assets/UDV-IZWNPfc9VDuHy9q4wA/mistakesdohappen3_98.pdf (studying the 
reports of 133 consumers). 
101 See ALISON CASSADY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK 
AT ERRORS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 13 (2004), available at http://georgiapirg.org/ 
sites/pirg/files/reports/MistakesDoHappen2004-1.pdf (studying the reports of 154 consumers). 
102 2008 FTC REPORT, supra note 98, at 7 tbl.2. 
103 CASSADY & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 101, at 11. 
104 GOLINGER WITH MIERZWINSKI, supra note 100, at 5. 
105 See infra text accompanying notes 116-26. 
106 See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & NAT’L CREDIT REPORTING ASS’N, CREDIT 
SCORE ACCURACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 21 (2002), available at http://www. 
consumerfed.org/pdfs/121702CFA_NCRA_Credit_Score_Report_Final.pdf.  
107 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-223, CREDIT REPORTING LITER-
ACY: CONSUMERS UNDERSTOOD THE BASICS BUT COULD BENEFIT FROM TARGETED 
EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS 28 (2005).  
108 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 12 (2006). 
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in 2009, reports of identity theft comprised 21% of all complaints to the 
FTC, a greater percentage than that of such seedy items as shop-at-home 
sales, foreign-currency scams, and sweepstakes.109  
One industry-financed study did find an error rate under 3%,110 but this 
research is flawed. It counted a data point as inaccurate only if the consumer 
was denied credit on the basis of the error, filed a dispute with the CRA, 
won that dispute, and succeeded in persuading the lender or other entity to 
reverse its earlier denial of credit.111 This error rate thus excluded consumers 
who received higher-priced credit as the result of errors, those who chose 
not to file disputes, those who lost their disputes with the CRAs, and those 
who were able to correct their reports but failed to obtain credit from the 
original source. 
An understanding of why there are so many inaccuracies requires a brief 
explanation of how credit reports are generated. The first step is the CRAs 
regularly downloading large quantities of data from “furnishers,”112 a group 
that includes lenders and other entities that report on consumer financial 
behavior.113 CRA algorithms then match each downloaded record to a 
consumer in their database.114 This matching process can be designed to be 
stricter or looser, by adjusting how closely a downloaded record must match 
an existing consumer file for the files to be merged.115 A strict system would 
require, for example, identical names, addresses, and social security numbers 
before two records could be merged. 
Creditors, however, tend to prefer looser algorithms—thus ensuring that 
they see all potential negative information about consumers applying for 
credit 116—and this approach appears to be the one that CRAs take. The 
 
109 FTC, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY–DECEMBER 2009, 
at 6 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-annual-reports/sentinel-cy2009. 
pdf. In 2006, this figure was 36%. Credit Reports: Consumers’ Ability to Dispute and Change Inaccurate 
Information: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 100th Cong. app. 57-58 (2007) [hereinafter 
Consumers’ Ability to Dispute] (testimony of Leonard A. Bennett). 
110 FTC, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTIONS 318 AND 319 OF THE FAIR AND 
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003, at 25-26 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 FTC 
REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/facta/041209factarpt.pdf.  
111 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.1.3.5. 
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 (2006) (detailing the responsibilities of furnishers in providing 
information to CRAs).  
113 See infra note 135.  
114 See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.3.3.2 (describing the process by which CRAs 
build their files); see also County Vanlines, Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 
383, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing matching procedures to generate business credit reports), 
aff’d, No. 04-2982, 2005 WL 3117211 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2005). 
115 See 2004 FTC REPORT, supra note 110, at 35-55. 
116 See, e.g., What Borrowers Need to Know About Credit Scoring Models and Credit Scores: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 
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National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), which has compiled a thousand-
page manual on credit reporting,117 directly attributes the high error rate in 
consumer reports to loose computer algorithms. “Mismerged files occur 
largely because the CRAs’ computers do not use sufficiently rigorous score 
or scale thresholds to match consumer data precisely, even when such 
unique identifiers as Social Security numbers are present.”118 Privacy expert 
Evan Hendricks has described how this works in practice:  
The general rule is if seven out of the nine digits [of two consumers’ Social 
Security numbers] match, they consider that a partial match, provided that 
some of the name information will match up as well. So, people who have 
only one or two digits different in their Social Security numbers and have 
enough common letters in their names and live in the same geographic re-
gion could be considered to be the same person by the computers, and that 
causes a mixed file.119  
Loose algorithms introduce even more errors when lenders order reports 
for the purpose of deciding whether to extend credit. The problem is that 
the CRAs use one set of parameters when generating reports for consumers 
and another when generating them for users.120 The CRAs use relatively 
complete matching algorithms with consumers but partial matching with 
users, which means that users may see negative or erroneous data not 
available to consumers ordering their own credit reports.121 Hendricks refers 
to the scores consumers can purchase with their reports as “FAKO” 
scores—a play on words on FICO credit scores.122 This discrepancy means 
that the credit reports used to determine creditworthiness are even less 
 
app. 122 (2008) [hereinafter What Borrowers Need to Know] (testimony of Evan Hendricks, Editor, 
Privacy Times) (stating that user versions of credit reports often have more information because 
“the CRAs attempt to include in them the maximum possible information that might relate to the 
consumer—in essence, so no negative item is missed”). 
117 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96. 
118 Id. at 121. 
119 Leslie McFadden, The Dark Side of Credit Reports and Scores, BANKRATE.COM ( Jul. 17, 
2007, 3:00 AM), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/pf_article_103239.html (interview 
with Evan Hendricks); see also Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 65 (testimony of 
Leonard A. Bennett) (“If two consumers have a similar name, even if not exact, and also share 
either an address or a social security number matching seven of nine digits, the CRAs will very 
often combine the two files.”). 
120 What Borrowers Need to Know, supra note 116, at app. 122-23 (testimony of Evan Hendricks). 
121 One reason that this type of loose matching occurs is because users are not required to 
submit social security numbers to obtain consumer reports. 2004 FTC REPORT, supra note 110, at 
38. As the NCLC reports, “as many as 10% of all inquiries [from users] do not include a valid 
Social Security number.” WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.3.4.  
122 What Borrowers Need to Know, supra note 116, at app. 121 (testimony of Evan Hendricks). 
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accurate than consumer surveys would indicate. Furthermore, consumers 
have no opportunity to dispute information provided only to users before it 
results in a denial of credit.123 
The difference in the reports that consumers and users receive may re-
flect an understanding that the partial matching system the CRAs use for 
creditors would not be acceptable to the general public. The CRAs ban 
resellers from providing consumers with the user versions of their credit 
reports,124 and the formulas the CRAs use to calculate scores are proprietary 
and protected as trade secrets.125 As such, the only way for a consumer to 
obtain the user version of her credit report is to apply for credit, be denied 
that credit, and then invoke a FACTA provision that allows consumers to 
request the report obtained by the lender during the credit check.126 
It is rational for the CRAs to prioritize creditor interests over consumer 
interests in generating credit reports because consumers are not the CRAs’ 
customer base. Since FACTA’s implementation, consumers have been able 
to obtain their credit reports without charge annually and in certain other 
circumstances,127 so CRAs have limited incentives to compete for consumer 
business. The one area in which the CRAs do compete for consumer 
business is in providing credit report monitoring services,128 but selling 
services consumers can use to correct their reports may actually decrease 
CRA incentives to ensure the accuracy of reports before consumers pur-
chase these services. 
Instead, the CRAs’ main revenue source is the users who purchase credit 
reports.129 The FTC has explained how competition for creditor business 
might result in high error rates:  
[L]enders may prefer to see all potentially derogatory information about a 
potential borrower, even if it cannot all be matched to the borrower with 
certainty. This preference could give the CRAs an incentive to design algo-
rithms that are tolerant of mixed files, which could harm consumers to 
whom the derogatory information is mistakenly assigned.130  
 
123 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 3.7.2.1 (“[P]ractitioners report that CRAs will hide 
information in the report to the consumer by truncating or deleting account numbers, or deleting 
subscriber addresses, which hinders a consumer in directly disputing an account with a creditor.”). 
124 What Borrowers Need to Know, supra note 116, at app. 120 (testimony of Evan Hendricks). 
125 HOWAT, supra note 27, at 1. 
126 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h) (2006). 
127 Id. 
128 See Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 84 (testimony of Leonard A. Bennett). 
129 See id. (“And despite the growing profits in credit monitoring services, the CRAs make 
most of their money from these collecting creditors.”).  
130 2004 FTC REPORT, supra note 110, at 47. 
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2. Flawed Credit Report Repair 
Once a consumer discovers an error, the process does not improve. 
There is ample evidence that many consumers have an excruciating time 
restoring their credit reports after discovering inaccuracies. Victims of 
identity theft and other errors can spend hundreds of hours in this process131 
and are often unsuccessful.132 The judicial opinions in this area show that 
consumers who attempt to fix their credit reports frequently file multiple 
complaints with CRAs before resorting to litigation.133  
This difficulty is a direct result of the flawed process the CRAs employ 
to investigate disputes. The CRAs do not appear to conduct investigations 
of consumer error complaints,134 but rather refer each disputed item to the 
furnisher who supplied it.135 This process is almost entirely automated.136 
Upon receipt of a consumer dispute, the CRA will condense it to fit on 
a one-page form, where it is represented by a two-digit code.137 This 
condensation occurs regardless of how much information the consumer has 
provided about the alleged inaccuracy. The standardized electronic form 
 
131 A 2010 study found that, on average, victims of identity theft spent 21 hours and $373 
resolving the issue. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2010 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY 
REPORT 5 (2010), available at https://www.javelinstrategy.com/uploads/files/1004.R_2010Identity 
FraudSurveyConsumer.pdf. Another study found that victims of identity theft spent an average of 
68 hours resolving its effects. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., IDENTITY THEFT: THE 
AFTERMATH 2009, AT 20 (2010), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/ 
1/Aftermath_2009_20100520.pdf. 
132 In their book, Wu and De Armond report the results of a 2007 Zogby poll finding that 
37% of consumers who ordered their credit reports discovered errors and that half of them had 
difficulty correcting these inaccuracies. See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.1.3.5 ; see also 
Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss Allocation Rules, 64 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 343, 359-60 (2003) (“Victims report that even after they demonstrate that fraud 
occurred, lenders refuse to take steps to prevent further damage from occurring, and persist in 
attributing the thieves’ transactions to the victims. Consumer reporting agencies are said to be 
particularly uncooperative.” (citation omitted)). 
133 See, e.g., Konter v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 960, 965 (W.D. Wis. 2009) 
(describing how the plaintiff and his lawyer filed five dispute letters before his twin sister’s 
information was removed from his credit report); Saenz v. TransUnion, L.L.C., 621 F. Supp. 2d 
1074, 1078-79 (D. Or. 2007) (noting that the plaintiff filed two disputes and a lawsuit before false 
information was corrected); see also WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.1.1 (“Consumers 
often are forced to file multiple disputes, then file litigation, before their credit reports are 
corrected.”). 
134 See, e.g., Gorman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 07-1846, 2008 WL 4934047, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008) (quoting the deposition of an Experian official who stated “we don’t do 
any other independent investigations” besides relying upon the furnisher). 
135 See supra note 85. 
136 See 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 15 n.87 (noting that FACTA requires CRAs to 
offer an automated system for furnishers to report the results of their investigations). 
137 For a sample form, see id. at appendix C. 
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does contain a one-line field that employees can use to add more infor-
mation, but this field is used in only 30% of cases.138 
Although the system contains twenty-six dispute codes, often listed in a 
drop-down menu,139 most of them are rarely used. According to furnisher 
reports, 30-40% of disputes arrive with “generic or catch-all dispute 
codes.”140 A high-profile consumer attorney claims that the same five 
generic codes are used nearly 90% of the time: “Not his/hers” (30.5%); 
“Disputes present/previous Account Status/History” (21.2%); “Claims Inac-
curate Information, Did not provide specific dispute” (16.8%); “Disputes 
Amounts” (8.8%); and “Claims account closed by consumer” (7.0%).141 
The CRAs do not forward any documentation to furnishers, even 
though they advise consumers submitting disputes to include documenta-
tion such as billing statements or letters from their creditors.142 The “Big 
Three” CRAs (Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion) actually have a policy 
of not forwarding these documents to the furnishers evaluating the accuracy 
of consumer disputes.143 In fact, the CRAs’ electronic system is not even 
capable of transmitting a consumer’s documentation.144 Equifax states, 
however, that it sometimes faxes documentation and that furnishers can 
request it.145 
Furnishers, in turn, have blamed the CRA system for not giving them 
enough information to conduct more than superficial investigations.146 As a 
 
138 Id. at 17. 
139 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.6.2. 
140 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 17. 
141 Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 82 (testimony of Leonard A. Bennett). 
142 See, e.g., EXPERIAN, http://www.experian.com/disputes/how-to-dispute.html (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2012) (explaining how to request an investigation); Dispute Information on Your Credit 
Report, (same); Online Dispute, EQUIFAX, https://www.ai.equifax.com/CreditInvestigation (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2012) (same); Request for Investigation, TRANSUNION, http://www.transunion.com/ 
docs/personal/InvestigationRequest_Chester.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (same). 
143 See, e.g., Dixon-Rollins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 09-0646, 2010 WL 3749454, 
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2010) (citing the testimony of a TransUnion team leader who stated that 
“Trans Union, as a matter of policy, never forwards material submitted by consumers to the 
original source”); 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 18 (stating that TransUnion typically does 
not forward consumer-supplied documentation to furnishers). 
144 See Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 76-77 (testimony of Leonard A. 
Bennett) (quoting a deposition from a vice president at Equifax). 
145 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 18. 
146 E.g., Letter from Christopher T. Curtis, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Capital One, to Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, et al. (May 22, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
comments/FACTA-furnishers/522110-00083.pdf, commenting on Interagency Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking: Procedures to Enhance the Accuracy and Integrity of Information 
Furnished to Consumer Reporting Agencies Under Section 312 of the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 14,419 (Mar. 22, 2006); see also Westra v. Credit Control of 
Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that furnisher-defendant’s investigation “was 
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result, the standard furnisher practice is to verify that the relevant consumer 
does, in fact, have an account and that the consumer’s basic information is 
correct.147 But this practice does nothing to address whether, for example, 
the account in the consumer’s name was fraudulently obtained. When a 
CRA receives verification from the furnisher of the existence of an account, 
it considers the consumer’s complaint meritless, even if the response does 
not address the point that the consumer is disputing.148 
Throughout this process, the CRA employees who handle the disputes 
have virtually no discretion. Two of the “Big Three” CRAs outsource their 
dispute processes internationally.149 Employees are evaluated on meeting 
“quality” and “production” targets, with “quality” defined as following the 
steps in the employee manuals and “production” meaning the number of 
disputes they process.150 The CRAs generally do not allow their employees 
to contact any live human beings, such as the consumers or the furnishers, 
in conducting their investigations.151 The only changes these employees are 
usually authorized to make to consumer credit reports are those that 
proceed directly from furnisher responses.152  
In a sign that the CRAs may realize that their investigation processes 
are compromised, the agencies maintain lists of “VIPs,” such as celebrities, 
lawyers, and politicians, whose reports of inaccuracies are investigated 
through a more thorough process.153 For Equifax and TransUnion, this 
special treatment appears to mean using U.S.-based employees to conduct 
the investigations, rather than outsourcing these disputes.154 
Even in the rare case that a consumer does manage to have an inaccuracy 
corrected, there is still a significant chance that the erroneous information 
will be reinserted at a later date. Despite the FCRA requirement that the 
 
reasonable given the scant information it received” from the CRA); Malm v. Household Bank, 
No. 03-4340, 2004 WL 1559370, at *4 (D. Minn. July 7, 2004) (finding a furnisher’s investigation 
sufficient given its limited information). 
147 See, e.g., Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, 357 F.3d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 2004) (describing a 
cursory review conducted by a furnisher to verify information); Plaintiff’s Complaint at 4-5, 
United States v. Credit Bureau Collection Servs., No. 10-169 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2010) (describ-
ing a furnisher’s procedures for processing disputes). 
148 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.4.2. 
149 See id. at 181 (describing Equifax’s and TransUnion’s outsourcing); Consumers’ Ability to 
Dispute, supra note 109, at 42 (statement of Leonard A. Bennett) (stating that TransUnion uses a 
vendor in India).  
150 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.6.4. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.; see also id. (“Each of the ‘Big Three’ CRAs also concedes that their employees are not 
permitted to exercise any personal discretion.”).  
153 Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, supra note 109, at app. 59-60 (testimony of Leonard A. Bennett). 
154 Id. 
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CRA correct or delete inaccurate information,155 when the change to be 
made is the deletion of an account, “the CRAs will only ‘soft-delete’ the 
account, invoking a function that suppresses or cloaks the information while 
still leaving it in the database.”156 So if the creditor changes the account 
number or the account is sold, the suppression will no longer hold.157  
If all else fails, a consumer does have the right to file a statement of dis-
pute explaining that she believes certain information in her report to be 
inaccurate.158 The CRA must then insert it in the credit report. Approxi-
mately 30% of consumers who have been unsuccessful in challenging their 
credit reports use this remedy.159 But it is largely ineffective. The statement 
of dispute is usually inserted at the bottom of the report, and creditors often 
do not see it or give it much weight.160 
The main benefit of automation is that it generates revenue for the 
CRAs. The CRAs spend well under $1.00 per dispute on processing,161 less 
than what the CRAs charge creditors each time a consumer submits a 
dispute about data that a creditor provided.162 In fact, the CRAs’ online 
processing system has become so profitable that the CRAs moved it from 
their nonprofit trade association, where it was created, to a for-profit 
company of which the three major CRAs each own a share.163 The revenue 
generation function of credit report errors undoubtedly enables the CRAs 
to keep their prices low. Charges for initial credit checks range from $1.25 to 
$3.00 per credit check, along with a $500 annual fee.164  
The savings to creditors may be passed on to some consumers in the 
form of lower credit costs and higher credit availability, but the sacrifice in 
accuracy means that these benefits will not be distributed appropriately. 
Consumers who are denied credit because of errors in their reports do not 
 
155 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
156 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.6.2.  
157 Id. 
158 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b). 
159 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 85, at 22. 
160 See, e.g., WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 14.7.4. 
161 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.6.4 n.918. See also, Consumers’ Ability to Dispute, 
supra note 109, at 42 (statement of Leonard A. Bennet) (“Equifax outsources all of its reinvestiga-
tion to a company in the Philippines that is paid 57 cents per dispute . . . .”). 
162 See id. § 4.5.6.1 (explaining that the e-Oscar electronic system handles consumer disputes). 
163 Id. 
164 See Shelby Grad, Trans Union Wins Credit Report Contract, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at 
B2 (reporting that TransUnion won the bid to provide Orange County with credit-reporting 
services for one year with a price of $1.25 per credit check); Ed Sacks, Landlords Go High-Tech to 
Check Credit, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 12, 1995, at 16 (reporting that larger property management 
firms can get credit reports for $3.00 each from national providers by paying an annual member-
ship fee of $500). 
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benefit from lower credit prices or greater credit availability. And any 
pricing benefits that emerge are cancelled out for consumers who are 
charged higher prices due to credit reporting errors. In addition, the 
consumers who spend extraordinary amounts of time and money repairing 
damage to their credit reports165 are almost certainly not receiving any net 
benefit. In many ways, these unlucky few are cross-subsidizing any lower 
prices or increased credit availability experienced by the rest of the con-
sumer population. 
These CRA investigation practices persist despite a legal regime that 
would appear to require much more. Under the FCRA, the CRAs are 
required to conduct “reasonable” investigations of all consumer disputes.166 
When conducting these investigations, CRAs must do more than blindly 
defer to the furnisher; they have three main sub-duties. First, they must 
provide the furnisher with “all relevant information regarding the dispute 
that the agency has received from the consumer.”167 Second, the CRAs must 
reasonably investigate the matter. 168 Third, the CRAs must “promptly 
delete [inaccurate] information from the file of the consumer, or modify 
that item of information, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinves-
tigation.” 169 Once inaccurate information has been deleted, “the infor-
mation may not be reinserted in the file by the consumer reporting agency 
 
165 See supra note 131. 
166 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
167 Id. § 1681i(a)(2)(A). It is an open question whether the CRAs’ policy of not forwarding 
consumer-provided documents to the furnishers violates this provision. Compare Dixon-Rollins v. 
Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 09-0646, 2010 WL 3749454, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2010) 
(affirming liability for TransUnion for failing to re-investigate plaintiff’s dispute), and Mullins v. 
Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 305-888, 2007 WL 2471080, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2007) (uphold-
ing judgment against TransUnion for willfully violating the FCRA by failing to investigate), with 
Morris v. Trans Union, 420 F. Supp. 2d 733, 740-41 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that TransUnion’s 
failure to develop policies and procedures for verifying creditor information did not amount to 
“willfulness”), and Konter v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 960, 971-72 (W.D. Wis. 
2009) (finding no violation and holding that the FCRA requires CRAs to forward only relevant 
information). 
168 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). In determining what constitutes a “reasonable” investigation, 
courts use a balancing test. See, e.g., Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225-26 (3d Cir. 
1997) (weighing the extent of information the defendant had against the cost of investigation). 
Even the most CRA-friendly cases use this balancing test. See, e.g., Lee v. Experian Info. 
Solutions, No. 02-8424, 2003 WL 22287351, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2003) (using the balancing test 
to uphold summary judgment for defendant). Despite these tests, the CRAs publicly maintain 
that they have no duty to look beyond the automated verifications they receive from furnishers. 
WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.5.3.4.5. 
169 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A)(i). 
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unless the person who furnishes the information certifies that the infor-
mation is complete and accurate.” 170 
There are volumes of case law on the issue, much of it finding CRA 
procedures to violate the FCRA,171 and the CRAs have entered into consent 
decrees with the FTC and state attorneys general.172 Yet these remedies 
have proven ineffective in generating change.  
Part of the problem appears to be that there are not enough lawyers 
practicing in this area to enable a density of lawsuits that would change 
CRA incentives.173 Another issue is that the FTC did not have adequate 
tools to change CRA practices, both in terms of resources and enforcement 
authority.174 The Dodd-Frank Act relocated regulatory responsibility for the 
FCRA to the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB), which has more direct enforcement powers than the FTC did. The 
CFPB has the authority to supervise “larger participant[s] of a market for 
other consumer financial products or services,”175 and one of its first acts 
after the appointment of its director was to issue a proposed rule that would 
define CRAs as larger market participants.176 This authority would enable 
the CFPB to implement my policy proposal more effectively than the FTC 
would have been able to do. 
 
170 Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(B)(i). The “soft-delete” system that the CRAs use arguably violates these 
requirements, and two courts have found this procedure unreasonable or potentially unreasonable. 
Cousin v. Trans Union, Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding the practice of soft-
deleting unreasonable); Jordan v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1358 (N.D. 
Ga. 2006) (categorizing the soft-delete at issue as an “unexplained ‘glitch’”—not defendant’s 
practice—and thus finding the CRA’s procedure reasonable). 
171 See Cousin, 246 F.3d at 368 (holding that the defendant knew about the problems with its 
cloaking procedure and was negligent in not fixing them). 
172 WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, app. K (summarizing enforcement orders secured by 
law enforcement agencies against CRAs); see also The Consumer Reporting Act of 1993: Hearing on 
H.R. 1015 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and 
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 316 n.1 (1993) (statement of Oakley Orser, Vice President of Credit, 
Belk Ctr., Inc.) (referencing an Equifax agreement with eighteen state attorneys general). 
173 The NCLC’s Chi Chi Wu estimates that there are somewhere between a few dozen and a 
couple hundred U.S. lawyers practicing in this area. Telephone Interview with Chi Chi Wu, Staff 
Att’y, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. (Aug. 19, 2011).  
174 Id. 
175 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2011). 
176 Defining Larger Participants in Certain Consumer Financial Products and Services Mar-
kets, 76 Fed. Reg. 38,059 (proposed June 29, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. X) [hereinafter 
CFPB Proposed Rule] (proposing to cover CRAs). 
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B. Blocking Data Generated by Identity Theft 
In 2003, Congress passed FACTA partly as a response to identity 
theft.177 One way to read the passage of FACTA is as a referendum on CRA 
practices regarding the matter.178 The statute, which was incorporated into 
the FCRA, provides a procedure for victims of identity theft that signifi-
cantly limits the CRAs’ discretion. The new provisions limit the CRAs’ role 
in identity theft cases to receiving reports from law enforcement authori-
ties. In addition, the provisions set short, mandatory deadlines for all CRA 
actions in identity theft cases.179 The FACTA definition of identity theft, 
however, excludes much coerced debt,180 and law enforcement agencies 
would be a poor choice for screening coerced debt reports. Thus, my 
proposal broadens the current provisions to include coerced debt and 
imports a decisionmaker who can more reliably determine the coerced or 
fraudulent nature of debt within a family. 
The FACTA provisions are a logical place to look for coerced debt rem-
edies, because in many ways, coerced debt is a subtype of identity theft. 
Identity theft can be broadly defined as a crime in which one person makes 
unauthorized use of another person’s identity, usually for financial gain.181 
Coerced debt meets these general criteria. It nevertheless fails to meet 
FACTA’s criteria for identity theft, because that crime is seen as one of 
fraud committed by strangers. 
Although it is inaccessible to many victims of coerced debt, FACTA’s 
blocking mechanism appears to be fairly effective, especially when com-
pared with the investigation procedures discussed in the previous subsec-
tion. The remedy enables consumers to block fraudulent transactions from 
their credit reports.182 This means that future potential creditors would be 
unable to see the negative items generated by identity theft. Unlike the 
 
177 See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 
1952, 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 20 U.S.C.) (noting that one of the 
Act’s purposes is “to prevent identity theft”). 
178 FACTA included six substantive titles, one of which was “Enhancing the Accuracy of 
Consumer Report Information.” Id. 
179 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006). 
180 See infra text accompanying notes 203-07. 
181 FCRA defines identity theft as “a fraud committed using the identifying information of 
another person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(q)(3). 
182 See id. § 1681c-2(a) (describing how a reporting agency “shall block the reporting of any 
information in the file of a consumer that the consumer identifies as information that resulted 
from an alleged identity theft” upon the receipt of certain materials). 
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FCRA provision for investigating inaccuracies,183 the blocking provision 
establishes a default that favors the consumer. Under this FCRA section, 
the disputed information is automatically blocked unless the CRA can 
verify it within fifteen days, with one fifteen-day extension available if the 
CRA needs more information and documentation.184 This default structure 
should make the blocking mechanism significantly more accessible to 
consumers. 
The blocking remedy is relatively new; it did not take effect until De-
cember 2004.185 There is virtually no case law186 or academic literature187 on 
how well the remedy works. The few anecdotal reports I could compile 
suggest that the remedy is far from perfect, although superior to the 
investigation process. Christopher Kittell, who blogs under the name 
“FCRA Lawyer,” states that many of his clients have either been unaware 
of the blocking mechanism or found blocking to be ineffective.188 However, 
lawyer Rick Kornis reports that he has found that this provision has worked 
for his clients, although he also believes that many unrepresented consum-
ers’ blocking requests fall through the cracks.189 A third lawyer whom I 
interviewed has also found the blocking mechanism to be moderately 
effective.190  
If FACTA’s blocking provision could be broadened to encompass more 
coerced debt, it might provide an effective remedy. This potential solution, 
however, presents both substantive and procedural challenges that I ulti-
mately address by leveraging the expertise of family courts to inform its 
enforcement. 
The requirements for accessing the identity-theft block pose two diffi-
culties for victims of coerced debt. The four requirements are “(1) appropriate 
 
183 FRCA’s investigation procedure gives the CRAs a thirty-day deadline to determine 
whether disputed information is inaccurate, but does not set a pro-consumer default if the 
deadline is not met. Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). 
184 16 C.F.R. § 603.3(a)(3)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
185 See Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 3(1)–(2), 117 Stat. 1952, 1953 (stating that FACTA would take 
effect twelve months after enactment). 
186 I was able to find only one case that dealt with 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2, Drew v. Equifax In-
formation Services, LLC, No. 07-00726, 2010 WL 5022466, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2010). 
However, in this case, the plaintiff added the § 1681c-2 claim during the middle of the case at the 
request of the court, id. at *2, so this opinion provides no lens through which to assess the 
effectiveness of the blocking remedy outside the context of litigation. 
187 A Westlaw search revealed no law review citations for 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2. 
188 Christopher Kittell, 15 U.S.C. 1681c-2, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT BLOG ( July 11, 
2009 9:37 AM), http://fcralawyer.blogspot.com/2009/07/15-usc-1681c-2.html. 
189 E-mail from Rick Kornis, Att’y, Kornis & Assocs., P.C., to author (Nov. 14, 2011, 14:33 
CST) (on file with author). 
190 Telephone Interview with Robert Sola, Att’y (Oct. 27, 2011). 
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proof of the identity of the consumer; (2) a copy of an identity theft report; 
(3) the identification of [the fraudulent information] by the consumer; and 
(4) a statement by the consumer that the information is not information 
relating to any transaction by the consumer.”191 The identity theft report 
and the consumer statement present barriers for many victims of coerced 
debt. 
The chief problem with the identity theft report is that it may require 
police involvement. The FCRA requires that the report be filed with a law 
enforcement agency, “the filing of which subjects the person filing the 
report to criminal penalties relating to the filing of false information, if, in 
fact, the information in the report is false.”192 Although the statute states 
that this law enforcement agency can be the United States Postal Inspection 
Service,193 the CRAs have discretion to request additional information,194 
and anecdotal evidence suggests that they will often not credit a consumer’s 
allegations of identity theft unless the victim files a police report.195  
But requiring law enforcement involvement in coerced debt is problem-
atic. Coerced debt exists at the intersection of two crimes, identity theft and 
domestic violence, that have a history of victim underreporting and police 
neglect. Law enforcement identity theft units are frequently under-
funded,196 especially considering that successful identity theft is difficult to 
trace and criminal penalties are too low to offset the minimal risk of prose-
cution.197 In addition, more than half of victims of identity theft never 
contact a law enforcement agency about the matter.198 Finally, there is 
anecdotal evidence that many police departments will not accept identity 
theft reports in which the thief is a family member.199 
 
191 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a)(1)–(4) (2006). 
192 16 C.F.R. § 603.3(a)(2) (2012). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. § 603.3(a)(3). 
195 See, e.g., Schatten v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 08-0322, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42801, at *6 
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2009) (noting that Sallie Mae’s ID Theft Affidavit requires the consumer to 
submit a police report). 
196 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-766, IDENTITY THEFT: GREATER 
AWARENESS AND USE OF EXISTING DATA ARE NEEDED 17-18 (2002). 
197 See Identify Theft Surveys and Studies: How Many Identity Theft Victims Are There? What Is 
the Impact on Victims?, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/print/ 
ar/idtheftsurveys.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (reporting on research finding that identity 
thieves “have just one in 700 chance of being caught by federal authorities”). 
198 See FTC, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT COMPLAINT DATA, JANU-
ARY–DECEMBER 2007, at 14 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-
annual-reports/sentinel-cy2007.pdf (finding that 35%-40% of identity theft victims contacted the 
police in fiscal years 2005–2007). 
199 Interview with Chi Chi Wu, supra note 173. 
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The relationship between police and victims of domestic violence has a 
difficult history. It took significant advocacy and high-profile litigation for 
police departments to take seriously domestic violence,200 and even now, the 
effectiveness of police response to domestic violence is controversial. 
Mandatory arrest statutes were passed beginning in the 1980s to address the 
historical unresponsiveness of police departments to domestic violence, but 
these laws have, in turn, raised the concern that they can imperil victim 
safety.201 DV victims may not want police assistance for reasons that range 
from a distrust of police that stems from their historic nonresponsiveness to 
fears that police involvement will anger the abuser and fail to keep the 
victim safe.202  
The second issue that blocks coerced debt victims from using the FACTA 
identity theft procedure is that identity theft is currently defined exclusive-
ly as a crime of fraud, not duress. This understanding is codified in the 
FACTA requirement that the identity theft victim provide “a statement by 
the consumer that the information is not information relating to any 
transaction by the consumer.”203 If the victim of coerced debt was forced to 
seek a loan under duress or under a combination of fraud and duress, she 
will have been personally involved in the transaction and therefore will not 
be able to meet this test. Even when the coerced debt was generated exclu-
sively by fraud, authorities may find it less believable that the consumer did 
not participate in the transaction when the perpetrator is her spouse or 
long-term partner. 
Simply rewriting FACTA to include identity theft based on duress, 
however, may not solve the problem. Such a standard would raise concerns 
about the potential for abuse, especially since the parties’ intimate relation-
ship could suggest collusion.204 The current statutory framework essentially 
relies on law enforcement agencies to screen out fraudulent claims of iden-
tity theft.205 But given law enforcement authorities’ checkered history with 
identity theft and domestic violence, they may not have the institutional 
 
200 See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970–1990, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 53 (1992) (describing the growth of court cases requiring police 
to enforce DV laws). 
201 See, e.g., Jean Ferguson, Professional Discretion and the Use of Restorative Justice Programs in 
Appropriate Domestic Violence Cases: An Effective Innovation, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF, no. 2, Summer 
2009 at 3, 5 (recounting the history of mandatory arrest laws). 
202 See, e.g., STARK, supra note 51, at 63 (stating that, at best, the chances that a batterer will 
go to jail as a result of any given incidence of abuse are approximately one in 10,000). 
203 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a)(4) (2006).  
204 Collusion is unlikely to occur under my proposal because of the required finding of do-
mestic violence. See infra text accompanying note 235. 
205 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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capability to judge cases of coerced debt. That is why my policy proposal 
recommends moving this determination to family courts, which have more 
relevant expertise. At its most basic, my reform substitutes a divorce 
procedure for the criminal procedure as the underlying legal mechanism on 
which CRAs must rely in making blocking determinations. 
C. Family Courts: A New Decisionmaker 
My proposal for addressing the credit-reporting effects of coerced debt 
builds on FCRA’s blocking remedy,206 replacing the law enforcement 
approach taken by the current statute with a family court approach.207 
Because credit reporting is so automated,208 it is important to preserve the 
procedural shape of the FCRA process: leveraging a decisionmaker outside 
of the credit reporting system whose determination is then mechanically 
applied by the CRAs. Under my proposal, a victim of coerced debt who was 
obtaining a divorce could request from the family court a ruling determin-
ing whether any of the debts that she owed were coerced. 
This could be done as part of the division of the family’s property. 
While the court is dividing the spouses’ debts and assets, it could also 
determine whether the abuser generated any of the debts in the victim’s 
name through fraud or duress. The victim could then use this certification 
to obtain the identity theft blocking remedy under the FCRA. My proposal 
would act as a substitute for the FACTA requirements of an identity theft 
report and a statement that the victim did not initiate any of the transac-
tions. The coerced debt block would function as the identity theft block 
does now, preventing users of consumer data from viewing records of the 
involuntary debt. As discussed in Part III of this Article, the block would 
apply to all creditors with respect to debts that were no longer outstanding 
and to employers, landlords, and basic utilities with respect to debts that the 
victim still owed. 
1. The Advantages of Using Family Courts 
Using family courts as the certification mechanism for coerced debt pro-
duces at least three major advantages. First, court procedures avoid the 
identification problems that plague the resolution of identity-theft cases. 
 
206 See supra text accompanying note 191. 
207 Alternatively, a proposal could incorporate both law enforcement and family courts, 
leaving the law enforcement option available for victims who found it more comfortable or wanted 
to avoid the costs of a disputed divorce. 
208 See supra subsection II.A.1. 
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Second, family courts have substantial expertise in making decisions about 
family finances. Third, using family courts is administratively efficient 
because, in many cases, they will already be deciding related issues.  
With respect to the first point, any procedure designed to address 
identity-related crime must develop a means of accurately determining 
identity. This is an inherent and difficult problem. Once an identity thief 
has substituted her own personal information for that of the victim, it 
becomes difficult for the victim to demonstrate that he is the real owner of 
that identity—the only way he can do so is by verifying his personal 
information, which may be inaccurate as a result of the identity theft.209 In 
the case of “traditional” identity theft, victims have been required to 
provide substantially more documentation than were those who stole their 
identities. Often, victims cannot make this case successfully.210  
Even when this specific problem is not present, the question of fraud 
may persist. Allegations of financial identity theft invite suspicion, because 
the victim is typically trying to avoid obligations in her name. Assertions of 
coerced debt are likely to be met with particular skepticism, because the 
person the victim will be blaming is her significant other, and it is easy to 
imagine two spouses colluding on this issue or the victim benefiting from 
the theft. In addition, victims of both traditional identity theft and coerced 
debt must prove a negative: that they did not incur a given financial 
obligation, although they often have limited access to information that can 
 
209 See Sovern, supra note 132, at 361 (“[C]redit bureaus sometimes change a consumer’s file 
to reflect false information submitted by the thief, and so victims attempting to prove their bona 
fides are met with the response that their proof does not conform to their existing file.”); see also 
James Grimmelmann, Known and Unknown, Property and Contract: Comments on Hoofnagle and 
Moringiello, 5 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 85, 88 (2010) (“[Identity theft] victims thus 
find themselves trapped in the Kafkaesque position of being unable to prove that they really are 
themselves . . . .”). I have first-hand experience with this problem. I had my identity stolen in 
March 2012. As part of the theft, the perpetrator changed the telephone number on my credit card 
account to her telephone number. When I tried to rectify the situation, the creditor would not 
speak to me because I failed its security test by giving the “wrong” telephone number. The 
creditor eventually identified me as the real Angela Littwin by matching my voice to the voice in 
recordings of earlier conversations I had had with the creditor. It was lucky for me that the 
creditor had saved those recordings. 
210 See Sovern, supra note 132, at 361 (“The minimal scrutiny given to identity thieves con-
trasts dramatically with the experiences of those trying to prove that their identity has been 
stolen. . . . While applicants for credit need not prove their bona fides, identity theft victims may 
be required to submit numerous documents to prove their claims.”); see also Anderson v. Trans 
Union, 405 F. Supp. 2d 977, 983 (summarizing a CRA’s statement that it could “match” a plaintiff 
with his credit report even without his social security number); WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 
96, § 4.5.2.3 (stating that CRAs will usually decline an investigation request when a consumer fails 
to provide a social security number, even though they regularly provide reports to users who do 
not do so). 
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show that someone else did.211 Because it is the perpetrators who actually 
entered into the transactions, they are the ones who received the records, 
and the victims often do not have access to them.212 
Having a court rule on identity theft can reduce these types of prob-
lems. In court, it is relatively easy for a victim of identity theft to show that 
he is who he claims to be because it is more difficult to perpetrate a fraud 
on a court than on a financial company with which one has little face-to-face 
contact. Standard court procedures reduce the risk of impersonation 
through processes such as strict verification of identity, the filing of records 
under penalty of perjury,213 and in-person appearances. Impersonation 
would be particularly difficult in a family court that is handling the parties’ 
divorce because the parties would already be before the court for other 
reasons. 
Adjudication can also lower the risk of certification of fraudulent coerced-
debt claims and, of equal importance, of the perception that fraudulent 
claims are being certified. One of the largest obstacles to achieving recogni-
tion for coerced debt is the concern that consumers will use fraudulent 
claims of coercion to avoid paying legitimate debts. Using a process as 
thorough as adjudication can alleviate this fear. Courts can engage in 
extensive fact-finding, which could include subpoenaing financial records 
and taking testimony if necessary. A neutral court that has thoroughly 
vetted the matter is more likely to arrive at an accurate result than the 
parties that currently make decisions about the validity of identity-theft 
claims: the CRAs and law enforcement officers. 
In addition to the general benefits of courts, family courts in particular 
have expertise in adjudicating both financial issues and matters related to 
domestic violence, often in the same cases. In determining child support, 
alimony, and property distributions, they frequently use complicated 
mathematical formulas that incorporate a variety of financial and non-
financial factors.214  
Financial issues abound in divorce. Divorcing spouses and their attor-
neys often create detailed spreadsheets of the family’s assets and liabili-
ties.215 Child support formulas involve complex calculations in which courts 
manipulate financial variables such as “the obligor’s preliminary assessment,” 
 
211 See Sovern, supra note 132, at 361. 
212 See supra notes 209-12. 
213 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (requiring unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury). 
214 See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text. 
215 E.g., VIOLET WOODHOUSE WITH DALE FETHERLING, DIVORCE & MONEY: HOW 
TO MAKE THE BEST FINANCIAL DECISIONS DURING DIVORCE, 174-80 (Emily Doskow ed., 
10th ed. 2011). 
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“the reduction fraction,” and the “harmonizing factor” used in the American 
Law Institute’s (ALI) recommended formula.216 The ALI rubric also 
includes specific factors, such as medical and daycare expenses, that are used 
in the means test that bankruptcy courts apply.217 In addition, family courts 
also engage in the valuation of assets, one of the most challenging tasks 
undertaken by financial courts such as bankruptcy courts.218 “[T]he trial 
really becomes a battleground over vigorously contested matters dealing 
with the worth of the varied marital assets.”219 Family courts must value not 
only traditional assets such as family homes, but also more complex assets 
like carry-back notes,220 interests in businesses,221 shareholder distributions 
from “S” corporations,222 and commercial buildings.223 
For purposes of adjudicating matters related to coerced debt, family 
courts also have an obvious advantage over other courts with financial 
expertise: they have experience adjudicating matters related to domestic 
violence.224 And in at least ten states, family courts even have experience 
applying judgments about domestic abuse to financial determinations, 
usually in property divisions.225 
 
216 The ALI formula reads: 
To establish the basic child-support obligation, the child-support formula should de-
termine the dollar amount of the obligor’s preliminary assessment; multiply it by the 
reduction fraction to establish a preliminary reduction; multiply the preliminary re-
duction by the harmonizing factor to establish a final reduction; and then subtract 
the final reduction from the preliminary assessment. 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
§ 3.05(5) (2002). 
217 Compare id. § 3.05(6)–(7) (calculating the amount of child support based on the child’s 
educational and medical needs), with 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)–(C) (providing a means test to 
determine whether a debtor is eligible to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7).  
218 See, e.g., Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 959 (1997) (describing the 
circuit split over the proper method for valuing consumer assets for “cram down” purposes in 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy). 
219 BARTH H. GOLDBERG, VALUATION OF DIVORCE ASSETS § 1.14 (1984).  
220 E.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 109 S.W.3d 258, 273-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
221 E.g., Fenstermaker v. Fenstermaker, No. 2004-T-0097, 2005 WL 2709571, at *1-2 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2005). 
222 E.g., Boone v. Boone, 899 So. 2d 823, 826 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
223 E.g., In re Marriage of Romey, No. 02-1539, 2004 WL 57566, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 14, 
2004). 
224 The laws of every state provide family courts with some jurisdiction over domestic vio-
lence. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 210 (2d ed. 2008). 
225 Several states consider domestic violence in dividing marital assets. See, e.g., Crowe v. 
Crowe, 602 So. 2d 441, 443 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (upholding a lopsided division of property in 
part because “the husband physically abused the wife and . . . abused alcohol throughout most of 
the children’s childhood [up to the] time of separation”); Comins v. Comins, 595 N.E.2d 804, 805 
  
398 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 363 
 
A few cases from these states illustrate the ways in which family courts 
have made finely tuned judgments in which they balance financial factors 
against the severity of the abuse. For example, in one Missouri divorce case, 
the court awarded the wife the marital home based on the husband’s twice 
putting a loaded gun in her mouth and awarded her a disproportionate share 
of the rest of the family’s assets because of his other physical abuse and 
infidelity.226 Another example is a case in which a Texas appeals court 
upheld an award of 81% of the family’s estate to the wife because of the 
husband’s physical abuse, including kicking his wife in front of one of their 
children.227 Experience with cases that bridge the financial and the deeply 
personal makes the family courts of these states uniquely well suited to rule 
on coerced debt. It also suggests that even in the other states’ family courts, 
institutional learning about these issues is possible. 
Family courts would also be an efficient actor in which to invest authority 
to adjudicate matters of coerced debt, because they already make some of 
 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (upholding an uneven property division because of the admitted existence 
of abuse and the economic help the wife’s family contributed to the marriage, although the 
physical abuse occurred thirty years before the divorce and resulted in relatively minor physical 
injuries); Handrahan v. Handrahan, 547 N.E.2d 1141, 1142-43 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that 
the wife did not owe the husband 25% of the marital home because “the husband’s drinking, which 
was frequent, was wont to degenerate into violence”); Dodson v. Dodson, 904 S.W.2d 3, 5, 10 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (awarding wife a larger share of the marital estate partially due to the 
husband’s misconduct, which included numerous extramarital affairs and several instances of 
physical abuse); Moran v. Moran, 612 A.2d 26, 28, 31 (R.I. 1992) (awarding permanent alimony 
because husband drank heavily and physically abused his pregnant wife and children); Ohendalski 
v. Ohendalski, 203 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. App. 2006) (upholding an award giving wife 81% of the 
estate in part because husband had engaged in physical abuse); Awad v. Rasmussen-Awad, No. 14-
02-01142, 2004 WL 744234, at *7 (Tex. App. Apr. 8, 2004) (approving unequal division to wife, 
where she “had health problems both before and after the parties separated—some, such as anxiety 
and emotional problems, due all or in part to” husband’s physical abuse). The District of 
Columbia also considers the economic effects of abuse when marital property is being distributed. 
See, e.g., Burwell v. Burwell, 700 A.2d 219, 224-25 (D.C. 1997) (overturning a district court’s 
decision for failure to consider the effects of the husband’s abuse and manipulation in worsening 
the couple’s economic health, despite presumption of equitable distribution in divorce). However, 
a minority of states will consider domestic abuse only when it is extreme. See, e.g., Stover v. 
Stover, 696 S.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Ark. 1985) (allowing consideration of the fact that the wife had 
been convicted of conspiracy to kill her husband to affect property division, but cautioning that 
the facts of the case before them were “bizarre”); In re Marriage of Sommers, 792 P.2d 1005, 1010 
(Kan. 1990) (declining to consider marital fault except in extreme cases, “where a party’s conduct 
is so gross and extreme that failure to penalize therefor would, itself, be inequitable”); McDougal 
v. McDougal, 545 N.W.2d 357, 361 n.7 (Mich. 1996) (disallowing the element of fault in the 
distribution of assets because husband’s behavior was not “outrageous”); Wenzel v. Wenzel, 472 
N.Y.S.2d 830, 833 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (upholding an unequal distribution of assets where the husband 
stabbed the wife multiple times without provocation and was convicted of attempted murder). 
226 Dodson, 904 S.W.2d at 5, 9-10. 
227 Ohendalski, 203 S.W.3d at 914. 
  
2013] Escaping Battered Credit 399 
 
the findings necessary to coerced debt determinations. In divorces in which 
the distribution of property is at issue, courts already compile detailed lists 
of the parties’ debts.228 In cases in which there are restraining orders or in 
which child custody is an issue, courts already make determinations about 
domestic violence.229 In states that consider domestic violence in property 
distributions, courts already generate the precise findings necessary to rule 
on whether a debt was coerced. The only differences between this type of 
property distribution and my proposals are that, under court direction, the 
criteria would be more explicit and the rulings would have the ability to 
affect credit reports. 
One problem with the framework I just presented is that some states 
and localities have separate, cheaper provisions for simple divorces that do 
not involve property divisions,230 so many victims of coerced debt could be 
obtaining their divorces without receiving a formal property division. This 
would disproportionately affect lower-income families because they are less 
likely to be able to afford the more expensive forms of divorce. However, 
even when the divorce does not include a property distribution, family 
courts may still be making factual findings about domestic violence. And 
even in simple divorces, the courts may have relevant expertise from 
adjudicating similar cases, which creates some administrative savings. 
Certainly, using family courts is more efficient than having CRAs hire 
additional decisionmakers and train them in domestic violence issues or 
than training law enforcement officers to understand the complex financial 
arrangements involved in coerced debt. 
2. The Test for Coerced Debt 
The precise contours of a test for coerced debt will undoubtedly need 
refining as more empirical work on the subject is conducted, but the 
outlines can be sketched now. There would be two major elements to the 
test: a pattern of domestic abuse and control as well as a finding that each 
debt was not generated voluntarily. 
The finding of domestic violence can borrow from or incorporate exist-
ing state law. Every state already has a definition of domestic abuse in its 
 
228 See supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text. 
229 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d) (West 2008) (establishing a rebuttable 
presumption that an abuser will not receive custody of or access to any children). 
230 See, e.g., SELF-HELP DIVORCE INFORMATION, WAKE COUNTY CLERK CT., available 
at http://web.co.wake.nc.us/courts/documents/Divorce_Packet.pdf (providing for a $167 uncon-
tested divorce in Wake County, North Carolina, in which there is no consideration of property 
divisions, alimony, or fault). 
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code, usually for the purpose of granting protective orders and making 
child-custody determinations.231 The FCRA should incorporate state 
definitions of domestic violence used in deciding issues whose factual 
underpinnings span the course of the marriage. Because pervasive control is 
the foundation of coerced debt,232 it is important that the abuse be a long-
term issue. The key is identifying a pattern of coercive behavior that pre-
vented the victim from exercising free will with respect to financial matters. 
For states that already incorporate domestic violence into property dis-
tribution laws, the definitions of abuse in these laws are the logical place to 
begin. For other states, child custody rules might be an appropriate source 
of law, because custody determinations are based on a long-term range of 
conduct.233 Further empirical research is needed to determine whether relief 
should be restricted to cases in which the abuse has a physical component, 
including threats, or whether to use a broader definition of domestic abuse. 
In the meantime, existing state law on domestic violence provides a starting 
point that would legitimize coerced debt determinations. 
The separate finding of domestic violence is necessary because it pro-
vides crucial context for the court. The underlying climate of fear and 
control in an abusive relationship is what enables coerced debt,234 and a 
background understanding of this pattern is essential for evaluating coercion 
claims about specific debts. A finding of domestic violence can prevent both 
the false positives and false negatives that might occur if each debt were 
judged without reference to the overall tenor of the relationship. It helps 
reduce false positives by decreasing the likelihood that parties will bring 
claims of coerced debt in cases in which particular credit transactions might 
look suspicious out of context, but in which there is no history of coercion. 
It may also discourage nonabusive spouses from colluding in order to obtain 
a determination of coerced debt. A finding of domestic violence on one’s 
 
231 See 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 854 (2012) (listing purposes for which 
courts may consider abuse); see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)( j) (2012) (setting up a 
rebuttable statutory presumption against child custody for a parent who has engaged in domestic 
abuse); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 2012) (stating that in any action concern-
ing custody or visitation rights, “court[s] must consider the effect of [any proven] domestic 
violence upon the best interests of the child”); FAM. § 153.004(c), (e) (directing courts to 
“consider the commission of family violence in determining whether to deny, restrict, or limit the 
possession of a child by a parent” and not to allow unsupervised visitation with parents whose 
behavior exhibits a “pattern of past or present child neglect or physical or sexual abuse by that 
parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child”). 
232 Littwin, supra note 1, at 973. 
233 Cf. DOM. REL. § 240 (requiring courts, when considering the effects of domestic vio-
lence on the best interests of the child, also to consider “other facts and circumstances as the court 
deems relevant”).  
234 Littwin, supra note 1, at 982. 
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legal record seems like an unacceptable price for helping one’s ex-spouse 
block certain debts from her credit report.235 Conversely, requiring an initial 
determination of domestic violence can help victims of coerced debt make 
their case. A finding that a given relationship is steeped in coercion can 
enable courts to see the menace behind transactions that might otherwise 
appear innocent. 
The second element of the test would be a determination about whether 
the victim entered a given transaction voluntarily. In practice, this decision 
would probably require analyzing whether the victim entered the transac-
tion through fraud or duress. Factual questions to consider might include 
whether the victim was aware of the transaction as it was taking place; 
whether it was, in fact, the abuser who completed the credit application or 
made the relevant purchases; whether the abuser hid information about the 
transaction from the victim; whether the victim, upon discovery of a 
fraudulent transaction, felt safe asking the abuser about it; whether the 
abuser threatened the victim in connection with the transaction; and 
whether the transaction was conducted in coercive circumstances, such as 
after a physical assault. Judicial findings about who benefited from any 
purchases would also inform this analysis. For example, a purchase of 
household goods would be less likely to be coerced than a purchase of items 
related to an abuser’s extramarital affair. 
It is important to include debt generated by fraud as well as duress in 
the definition of coerced debt because in an abusive relationship, the 
dynamics of coercion can be a critical factor in enabling fraud. In my 
preliminary study of coerced debt, advocates reported that abusers engaged 
in a range of behaviors that prevented victims from discovering fraudulent 
debt or from taking action upon discovery. These behaviors included 
restricting victim’s access to the family’s mail;236 putting the victim on an 
allowance so that she had no direct interaction with the family’s finances;237 
 
235 One way to further discourage collusion would be to have the coerced debt appear as a 
negative item on the abuser’s credit report. I would be concerned, however, that this approach 
would move too far in the opposite direction by dramatically increasing an abuser’s resistance to 
motions for certifying coerced debt. In addition, under my proposal, the abuser whose record was 
tarred would not benefit from the finding of coerced debt. This characteristic distinguishes the 
risk of collusion under my proposal from historical collusion between spouses seeking divorces in 
fault-only jurisdictions. In those cases, both spouses received the benefit of obtaining a divorce. 
See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2000) (noting that historically in fault-only jurisdictions, spouses wishing 
to divorce would collude to have one party file a sham lawsuit alleging statutory violations to 
obtain a divorce decree from the court).  
236 Littwin, supra note 1, at 998. 
237 Id. at 983-84. 
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forbidding the victim from asking about financial matters;238 and having the 
victim sign documents with no opportunity to read them.239 All of these 
actions rely on duress, but enable the abuser to engage in fraud. 
The voluntariness test would apply to each debt separately. If a victim 
alleged duress or fraud in a number of debts, the court could make a 
positive finding for some and a negative finding for others. In many cases, a 
debt may be partially coerced. This is especially likely for credit card debt, 
which is usually composed of multiple transactions made over an extended 
period of time.240 Dividing such debts could quickly become complicated, 
because when a credit card loan is in default, much of the balance is com-
posed of fees and interest unrelated to specific transactions.241 Unfor-
tunately, it may not be possible for courts to label debts as partially coerced, 
because my proposal relies on blocking the existence of each debt on credit 
reports, and a debt cannot be partially blocked. The best a court could do in 
such circumstances would be to reduce the reported balance to the extent 
that the debt was coerced. Alternatively, if this process became unworkable, 
courts could block any debt that they determined was more than 50% 
coerced. In such cases, courts should look at the balance of the transactions 
with a special emphasis on how the credit card was obtained. 
After determining that one or more debts were, in fact, coerced, the 
court would issue a certification of coercion that would list the relevant 
debts. The victim could then submit this certification to the CRAs, where it 
would have one of two effects described in Part III, depending on the 
repayment status of the debt. 
3. Implementation 
My proposal could be implemented by amending the FCRA to provide 
an additional means of obtaining the blocking remedy discussed in Section 
II.B.242 Alternatively, the ECOA already has one regulation that can be 
read to disallow the consideration of coerced debt in lending decisions,243 
and this provision could be expanded to make its protections clearer and 
 
238 Id. at 985-86. 
239 Id. at 990. 
240 Cf. Mann, supra note 39, at 384 (noting that transaction-based issuers of credit cards 
profit from customers with a high volume of transactions). 
241 See id. at 386 (“[T]he decision to carry a balance [on a credit card] leads immediately to 
interest charges on the cardholder’s account, which accrue at a [high] rate. . . . Moreover, once the 
borrower begins to carry a balance, the likelihood of late and over-limit fees can increase 
substantially.”). 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 177-205. 
243 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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more user-friendly. In both cases, the certifications of coerced debt generated 
by state family courts would become evidence submitted to the CRAs to 
block coerced debts in accordance with my proposal. 
a. Alternative Implementation Through the ECOA 
Instead of amending the FCRA’s blocking provision, it would also be 
possible to implement my policy proposal through the ECOA.244 The 
advantage to using the ECOA is that the changes could take place at the 
regulatory, rather than the statutory, level. ECOA regulatory authority has 
always been broad,245 and under the Dodd-Frank Act, power to implement 
the statute was transferred from the Federal Reserve to the CFPB.246 This 
transfer allows the CFPB to implement this part of my proposal on its own, 
without waiting for Congress. As discussed above, the CFPB has already 
strongly signaled its intent to regulate the credit reporting industry.247  
There is already an ECOA regulation that can be read to require credi-
tors to exclude coerced debt from their consideration of an applicant’s credit 
history. The provision currently requires creditors to consider, “[o]n the 
applicant’s request, any information the applicant may present that tends to 
indicate the credit history being considered by the creditor does not accu-
rately reflect the applicant’s creditworthiness.”248 
Research revealed only one written judicial opinion interpreting this 
provision, and the court’s opinion in that case suggests that the provision’s 
scope is fairly broad.249 In that case, the consumer-plaintiff was trying to 
exclude from consideration some bankruptcy-related credit history that 
should not have been included in the creditor’s assessment of her credit-
worthiness.250 Interestingly, the creditor-defendant argued that the provi-
sion applied only to “problems arising in connection with joint accounts 
with a spouse or former spouse,” because it appeared in a subsection with 
two regulations addressing spousal credit issues.251 The court rejected the 
 
244 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2006). 
245 See id. § 1691b(a) (directing the regulatory body to “prescribe regulations . . . as in the 
judgment of the Bureau are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter 
[Equal Credit Opportunity], to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate or 
substantiate compliance therewith”). 
246 Id. § 1691b. 
247 See CFPB Proposed Rule, supra note 176.  
248 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(ii) (2012). 
249 See Jones v. Keycorp Bank, No. 07-12383, 2008 WL 324126, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 
2008) (holding that the regulation was meant to allow applicants to correct any information in a 
faulty credit report, not only misinformation for joint accounts). 
250 Id. at *1. 
251 Id. at *2. 
  
404 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 363 
 
creditor’s argument, citing the plain language of the provision.252 The 
creditor’s argument that the regulation covered only spousal debts suggests 
that applying it to these debts would be relatively uncontroversial. 
This regulation would, however, be significantly more effective for 
coerced-debt cases if it were to explicitly cover coerced debt. Much like my 
proposed blocking mechanism under the FCRA, the regulation could be 
changed to state that a certification of coerced debt by a family court 
requires the exclusion of that debt from credit-granting decisions. The 
regulation could then provide guidelines for family courts, and the CFPB 
could promulgate forms to be used in the certification process. 
The regulation could also be strengthened by deleting the phrase “on 
the applicant’s request.”253 Because the ECOA covers creditors rather than 
CRAs, only rules that apply in all circumstances become incorporated into 
CRA practice. For example, the CRAs currently do not report race or 
marital status,254 because the ECOA bans creditors from ever considering 
these factors.255 If the regulation prohibited creditors from considering 
coerced debt in all cases—rather than only when consumers protested its 
inclusion—the CRA reports would exclude this information. This would 
thus enable consumers to contact the CRAs about coerced debt instead of 
having to approach each potential creditor individually. 
The ECOA regulations are due for an update. The statute and its regu-
lations contain anachronisms, such as one provision addressing the status of 
consumers who do not have telephones in their homes256 and another on the 
effects of usury laws.257 More importantly, the ECOA does not take into 
account the changing nature of credit discrimination, of which the advent of 
coerced debt is one part. The ECOA was passed in 1974258 to prevent 
 
252 Id. The court ultimately granted the creditor’s motion to dismiss on other unrelated 
grounds. Id. at *3. 
253 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(ii). 
254 See, e.g., Information Factored in Score, EQUIFAX (May 31, 2012, 3:03 PM), https://help. 
equifax.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/138/~/information-factored-in-score (listing “race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, sex, or marital status” as factors not considered in calculating a credit score). 
255 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2006). 
256 See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(4) (“A creditor shall not take into account whether there is a 
telephone listing in the name of an applicant for consumer credit but may take into account 
whether there is a telephone in the applicant’s residence.”). 
257 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(d) (“When each party to a marriage separately and voluntarily 
applies for and obtains separate credit accounts with the same creditor, those accounts shall not be 
aggregated or otherwise combined for purposes of determining permissible finance charges or 
permissible loan ceilings under the laws of any State or of the United States.”). 
258 Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974). 
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lenders from discriminating against women.259 The 1970s were a time of 
consumer credit scarcity,260 and before the ECOA, many women had been 
unable to obtain credit in their own names.261 Accordingly, the ECOA 
focused on issues like ending discriminatory denials of credit and helping 
women build their credit histories. 
The case for updating the ECOA’s regulations becomes even clearer 
upon closer examination of the provision that immediately precedes the one 
discussed above. Under this regulation, creditors are required to include 
spousal authorized user transactions in their credit determinations.262 This 
means that when Spouse A is an authorized user on Spouse B’s credit 
account, any transactions associated with the account become part of Spouse 
A’s credit report, even though Spouse B is the only person liable for any 
resulting debt.263 This provision applies only to spousal credit accounts. It 
was designed as a prophylactic measure to bolster the credit reports of 
married women.264 
But since the 1970s, consumer lending has undergone a massive trans-
formation.265 Credit is widely available,266 and excluding negative credit 
transactions from one’s credit report has become as important as incorporat-
ing positive transactions. It is difficult to imagine today’s lenders engaging 
in the type of per se gender discrimination that took place before the 
ECOA. Any different treatment that remains is likely to be an effect of 
 
259 See, e.g., Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The purpose 
of the ECOA is to eradicate credit discrimination waged against women, especially married 
women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for individual credit.”). The ECOA was 
amended in 1976 to include race, ethnicity, age, and other prohibited classifications. Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251. 
260 For a history of the rapid expansion of consumer lending in the late twentieth century, 
see David A. Moss and Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, 
or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 327-46 (1999). 
261 See, e.g., Anderson, 666 F.2d at 1277. 
262 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(i) (2012). 
263 See, e.g., Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, 357 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2004) (requiring credi-
tors to conduct a reasonable investigation into whether the ex-husband’s credit account was 
factored into the wife’s credit report); Alabran v. Capital One Bank, No. 04-935, 2005 WL 
3338663, at *8 (E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2005) (holding that although plaintiff was an authorized user on 
the spouse’s account, he was not responsible for the debt of the account).  
264 See, e.g., GREGORY M. TRAVALIO, ANDERSON’S OHIO CONSUMER LAW MANUAL § 12.10 
(MB rev. ed. 2012) (explaining in brief the history of this section of the ECOA regulations). 
265 See supra note 260. 
266 See, e.g., John Kiernan, Card Hub’s 6 Credit Predictions for 2012, CARD HUB (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.cardhub.com/edu/credit-predictions (“As we all know, available credit withered during 
the Great Recession but has since bounced back.”). 
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negative credit-scoring events that disproportionately affect women, and 
coerced debt may be such an event.267  
Today, the authorized user provision may be exacerbating the effects of 
coerced debt. In a time when credit may be too easy to obtain—especially in 
someone else’s name—the regulation may be inclusive to a fault, because it 
mandates the credit reporting of an account over which the authorized user 
has no control. In an authorized use account, only the debtor receives and 
pays billing statements. If the debtor spouse is uncooperative, it is difficult 
for the authorized user spouse to obtain information about account balances 
and to make payments. When coerced debt is involved, the authorized user 
situation can quickly become untenable. Even if the victim knows or finds 
out about the account, she will be unable to close the account and may have 
difficulty making payments, because she will not be the debtor. She may be 
able to have her name removed as an authorized user, but some of the 
professionals I interviewed for the coerced debt study said that even this 
could be difficult.268 
An update of the ECOA regulations is needed to bring them into 
alignment with the realities of today’s credit market. The authorized user 
regulation should be amended to make the exclusion of authorized use data 
the default, although it could provide an exception for consumers who can 
show that certain authorized use information is relevant. In addition, the 
provision that allows for the exclusion of certain negative credit data should 
be amended to apply broadly and to include coerced debt. 
b. State Court Enforcement 
My proposal may raise federalism concerns in that it involves the federal 
government directing state governments to take certain actions. However, 
it likely falls on the permissible side of the anticommandeering line drawn 
by the Supreme Court in Printz v. United States269 and New York v. United 
States,270 because it applies to state judicial officers rather than to executive 
or legislative officers. In Printz and New York, the Court held that the 
federal government cannot compel the actions of the states’ executive and 
legislative branches, respectively. The Printz Court specifically distinguished 
 
267 See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 1, at 978-81 (arguing that the phenomenon underlying coerced 
debt—coercive control—is gendered). 
268 Telephone Interview with Laura Russell, Supervising Att’y, Legal Aid Soc’y (Sep. 15, 2011). 
269 See 521 U.S. 898, 907-09 (1997) (explaining the difference, in constitutional terms, be-
tween commandeering state judges and commandeering state executive or legislative officers). 
270 See 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992) (explaining that federal “direction” of state judges is 
“mandated” by the Supremacy Clause). 
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state executive officers from state judicial officers, finding that the existence 
of historical evidence that the early federal government compelled state 
judicial officers to enforce federal law did not mean that state executive 
officers could be similarly bound.271  
Nonetheless, my proposal might be considered more intrusive than the 
pricing statute at issue in Testa v. Katt, the case on which the Printz Court 
relied for the principle that state courts must enforce federal law.272 Testa 
addressed the relatively simple situation of a federal statute that could be 
enforced in either state or federal court.273 In contrast, my reform would be 
implemented as part of a proceeding that is entirely a creature of state law. 
It thus might be perceived as an attempt to augment state family codes. 
This would be especially true if the reform incorporated state law defini-
tions of domestic abuse. On the other hand, my proposal would not change 
the rights or duties of any parties to a divorce; its only effect would be on 
credit reporting, which is governed by federal law. 
Alternatively, even if the federal government could not require state 
courts to implement my policy, it could still enable them to do so, either on 
the courts’ own initiative or as directed by supplemental state statutes or 
judicial rules. The federal statute or regulation could use conditional 
language stating that if a state family court makes a finding of coerced debt, 
that finding would be binding on the CRAs. 
Federal law could be supplemented with efforts to amend state statutes 
or judicial rules and to lobby state judicial organizations that disseminate 
best practices information to courts. Another way to increase state court use 
of the certification option would be to target the domestic violence trainings 
that many states require for their judiciaries.274 In some states, divorcing 
 
271 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907 (“These early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was 
originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal 
prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power. 
That assumption was perhaps implicit in one of the provisions of the Constitution, and was 
explicit in another. . . . It is understandable why courts should have been viewed distinctively in 
this regard; unlike legislatures and executives, they applied the law of other sovereigns all the 
time.”). 
272 See id. at 928-29 (“Testa stands for the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply 
federal law . . . .”). 
273 See 330 U.S. 386, 387 (1947) (“[The statute] provides that federal district courts shall have 
jurisdiction of such suits ‘concurrently with State and Territorial courts.’”). 
274 See, e.g., ROBERT A. FALL, NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE JUDICIAL EDUCATION—COMPONENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM 1-
2, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/Components%20of%20an%20Effective%20Prgrm%20 
for%20DV%20Judicial%20Education.pdf (describing New Jersey’s judicial education program on 
domestic violence). 
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parties are already required to submit financial disclosure forms; these could 
be modified to encompass coerced debt.275 
In either the mandatory or the optional scenario, the CFPB, which now 
has jurisdiction over the FCRA and the ECOA, could promulgate a form 
for family courts to use. Family court practice already relies heavily on 
forms and language from standardized templates,276 so it would not be 
burdensome for divorcing parties to submit such forms to the court or for 
courts to sign off on them. The use of forms has the additional advantage 
that they could be incorporated into the books and web sites used by family 
court mediators and pro se parties,277 thus enabling coerced debt certifica-
tion to take place even in divorces with no judicial hearings or legal repre-
sentation. 
III. BLOCKING COERCED DEBT 
This Part addresses the legal effects of the coerced debt certification 
proposed in Part II. Because my proposal alters only the reporting of 
coerced debt, not the consumer’s liability for it, I have separated my 
reforms into two sub-proposals: one for debt that is already no longer 
legally binding and one for debt that is still outstanding. Creditors have 
different reasons for valuing information about these two types of debt. 
Data on past debt are useful only for their predictive power, while data 
about outstanding debt also provide creditors with information about a 
consumer’s current and future available funds. The “predictive interest” can 
be preserved when blocking coerced debt from a credit report, but the 
“current liabilities” interest cannot. 
There is a crucial difference between the FCRA’s identity-theft blocking 
mechanism and my proposal: the treatment of liability. The FCRA is supple-
mented by other federal statutes that alter legal responsibility for fraudulent 
debt. While a consumer is seeking to block a fraudulent debt under the 
FCRA, she may also be seeking to discharge her liability for it under 
another federal statute. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) limit the amount for which consumers 
 
275 E.g., FORM FL-155, CAL. CTS. (2004), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ 
fl155.pdf. 
276 See, e.g., TX Family Law Premium LexisNexis Forms, LEXISNEXIS, http://w3.nexis.com/ 
sources/scripts/info.pl?FRAMES=Data&301121&GCC=true (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (“With 
more than 1,600 family law forms online, TX Family Law Premium LexisNexis Forms contains a 
comprehensive collection of forms for family law practice in Texas . . . .”). 
277 E.g., JOHN VENTURA & MARY REED, DIVORCE FOR DUMMIES (3d ed. 2009). 
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can be held liable for fraudulent use of their credit and debit cards.278 
Policymakers appear to expect consumers to simultaneously seek protection 
under the FCRA and these unauthorized use provisions. For example, the 
FTC provides a single identity theft affidavit that solicits information 
consumers need to meet the requirements for both statutory regimes.279 
This overlap means that a debt blocked under the FCRA is also likely to 
be invalidated under the TILA or the EFTA, which is important for future 
potential creditors of consumers. Otherwise, a consumer’s legal liability 
could exceed the liabilities listed on her credit report, which would com-
promise the current liabilities interest of potential creditors. Even under the 
current system, there is some risk of this problem. A consumer might not 
pursue or attain the unauthorized use remedies in addition to the FCRA 
block. But the risk is significantly greater when there is no liability relief 
provision available. Thus, I propose a complete coerced debt block on past 
liabilities but a narrower block for debts a consumer still owes. 
A. The Predictive Power of Past Debt 
The first effect of submitting a certification of coerced debt to the CRAs 
would be to block from the consumer’s credit report all coerced debts she no 
longer owed. These debts present a relatively easy case. Blocking them does 
not mislead creditors about the extent of a consumer’s current indebtedness, 
and the coerced nature of the debts means that their initial accumulation 
does not accurately reflect a consumer’s risk profile.  
Records of past obligations are important for their predictive power. 
The idea is that consumers maintain consistent approaches to debt payment 
such that payment history will be relevant to future payment behavior.280 
These data enable creditors to answer questions about consumer behavioral 
tendencies—such as promptness and willingness to make payments under a 
 
278 See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2006) (limiting consumer liability for 
unauthorized credit card charges to fifty dollars); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1693g(a) (2006) (limiting consumer liability for unauthorized debit card charges to fifty dollars 
or the money used before the financial institution had constructive notice, whichever is less). 
279 See FTC, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM’S COMPLAINT AND AFFIDAVIT, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/resources/forms/affidavit.pdf (“A voluntary form for filing a report 
with law enforcement, and disputes with credit reporting agencies and creditors about identify 
theft-related problems.”). The affidavit contains three “declarations,” which consumers can 
confirm or disaffirm. Id. One of the declarations (whether the consumer is willing to work with 
law enforcement) targets an FCRA requirement in 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a)(2). A second (whether 
the consumer authorized the transactions) targets various provisions of the FCRA and TILA. The 
third (whether the consumer derived any benefit from the transaction) addresses a TILA 
unauthorized use provision in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o). 
280 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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variety of financial circumstances—that would be otherwise difficult to 
determine. But when a debt is incurred involuntarily, a consumer’s payment 
history is less likely to be representative. This is especially true when the 
consumer was not even aware of the debt’s existence. 
1. Treatment of Past Debt Under My Proposal 
In many cases, by the time a victim learns of a coerced debt, it may have 
been paid off already or rendered uncollectable for other reasons, such as 
bankruptcy or the expiration of the statute of limitations. But if such a debt 
were ever delinquent, it would still have a significant negative impact on 
the victim’s credit rating. Although the CRAs do not release the precise 
details of their credit scoring algorithms,281 FICO, which claims to promul-
gate the most commonly used formula,282 publishes a list of the factors it 
considers. Under the FICO model, payment history is the most important 
variable, counting for 35% of a score.283 Payment history is even weighted 
more heavily than a consumer’s current amount owed, which comprises 30% 
of the score.284 So blocking past coerced debt could significantly improve 
victims’ credit scores.  
Excluding coerced debt that is no longer outstanding should not have a 
major negative effect on future creditors, because the purpose of including 
past debt on a credit report is predictive.285 The usefulness of one’s pay-
ment history is predicated on the belief that consumers’ track records are 
predictive of their future payment behavior.286 But in the case of a victim of 
coerced debt who has divorced her abuser, this inference may no longer be 
justified. A court of law will have determined that the victim did not 
voluntarily create the debt, so its existence should have less predictive 
value. The payment history on coerced debts may very well reflect the 
abuser’s willingness and ability to make prompt payments, not the victim’s.  
The exact relationship between past coerced debt and victims’ future 
payment tendencies is an empirical question that will require further 
research,287 but it is still useful to think through some of the plausible 
 
281 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
282 See How Credit Scoring Helps Me, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/ 
scoringhelps.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (“Credit scores—especially FICO® scores, the most 
widely used credit bureau scores—have made big improvements in the credit process.”). 
283 What’s in my FICO Score, supra note 28. 
284 Id. 
285 Thus, any cost-of-credit concerns about my proposal are likely to have limited applicability. 
286 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
287 Answering this question would require a large, controlled study comparing the credit 
histories of past victims of coerced debt with those of the general population. The feasibility of 
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scenarios now. In situations in which the victim was not aware of the 
coerced debt, the payment history (or lack thereof) will be entirely attribut-
able to the abuser. In circumstances in which the victim knew of the debt 
but incurred it under duress, her ability to make payments could easily be 
compromised and thus not reflect her payment tendencies under noncoercive 
conditions. Even when the victim is able to make payments without 
interference, one can imagine that she might prioritize “her” debts over 
those generated by the abuser.  
The above points examine the predictive potential of past coerced debt 
on the payment of future voluntary debt, but my proposal also implicates 
questions about the effect of past coerced debt on the likelihood of future 
coerced debt, generated either by the current abuser or a future abusive 
partner. In the case of the current abuser, the primary argument would be 
that victims of domestic violence may return to the abuser multiple times 
before leaving for good.288 This would give the abuser additional opportuni-
ties to incur coerced debt in the victim’s name. However, in order to access 
the coerced debt–blocking remedy, a victim must be in the process of 
divorcing her abuser, a step that is indicative of a permanent break in the 
relationship. There are never any guarantees that a given relationship—
abusive or not—is fully terminated, but divorce is a generally accepted end 
point. In addition, a divorce may represent a victim’s best chance of estab-
lishing herself as an independent financial unit.289 Though there may be 
plausible concerns that even a former abusive partner could generate 
coerced debt, for example, by applying pressure via stalking or by using 
 
such a study is undermined by the fact that consumers can obtain only their current credit reports, 
not past credit reports. Time-series credit report data would be essential to tracking consumer 
payment histories over time. In general, too little is known about the extent of credit scores’ 
predictive power because the CRAs refuse to release their scoring formulas. It seems reasonable to 
speculate that the predictive power of credit scores is generally high because CRAs have strong 
incentives to meet creditors’ needs, and creditors want predictive scores. But it is difficult for 
policymakers to evaluate proposals to include or exclude different types of information—such as 
coerced debt—from credit reports when researchers outside the CRA industry cannot measure the 
predictive value of various types of data. 
288 For example, there is a widely referenced statistic that DV victims attempt to leave abu-
sive relationships an average of seven times before succeeding. See, e.g., CASCADE CTRS., INC., 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2, available at http://www.wellness.uci.edu/domesticviolence.pdf; Julie 
Baumgardner, Domestic Violence, FIRST THINGS FIRST, http://firstthings.org/domestic-violence 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012); Information on Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC ABUSE SHELTER OF 
THE FLA. KEYS, http://www.domesticabuseshelter.org/InfoDomesticViolence.htm (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2012). I was not, however, able to identify any scholarly research either supporting or 
refuting this claim. 
289 However, much more work is needed on this topic. See generally Michael A. Anderson et 
al., “Why Doesn’t She Just Leave?”: A Descriptive Study of Victim Reported Impediments to Her Safety, 18 
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 155 (2003). 
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personal identification information acquired during marriage, the policy 
considerations discussed below still militate in favor of blocking coerced debt. 
With respect to concerns about potential future abusive partners, the 
vast majority of DV survivors are not repeat victims. The most recent, 
major national survey of domestic violence found that, among female 
respondents who had experienced domestic violence, 70.8% had had only 
one abusive partner over the course of their lifetimes.290 Thus, fewer than 
30% of DV survivors are victimized by future partners. In comparison, the 
same study found that 35.6% of females in the general U.S. population had 
experienced domestic violence at some point during their lives.291 There-
fore, past domestic violence does not appear to be correlated with future 
domestic violence by new partners, and because my definition of coerced 
debt depends on a finding of domestic violence, past victims of coerced debt 
are equally unlikely to be future victims of coerced debt at the hands of a 
new partner. 
Finally, even if there are some situations in which past coerced debt 
predicts future coerced debt, that does not necessarily mean that creditors 
should have access to this information. Federal law already prohibits credit 
discrimination on the basis of several classifications that would probably 
improve the predictive power of credit-scoring formulas, and DV status is a 
particularly important classification to protect. The ECOA prohibits many 
forms of credit discrimination. It was originally passed in 1974 to address an 
issue related to the topic of this Article, lending discrimination on the basis 
of gender and marital status.292 The statute and its regulations have since 
been broadened to cover additional classifications such as race, religion, and 
age.293  
Many of these characteristics are statistically significant in predicting 
creditworthiness. The regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve state 
that even statistically sound formulas cannot be used if they negatively 
impact certain groups. For example, creditors may not include age as a 
variable if a credit-scoring formula has a negative impact on elderly con-
sumers, but may use it if senior citizens are affected positively.294 The 
 
290 MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 48 (2011), available at http://www.cdc. 
gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_executive_summary-a.pdf. 
291 Id. at 39. 
292 See supra notes 258-64 and accompanying text. 
293 See supra note 259. 
294 See 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(2)(ii) (2012) (“[A] creditor may use an applicant’s age as a pre-
dictive variable provided that the age of an elderly applicant is not assigned a negative factor or 
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regulations also specifically prohibit using aggregate statistics about child 
bearing in evaluating creditworthiness.295 The modern reader may be 
startled to learn that questions regarding birth control were common on 
pre-ECOA loan applications,296 but from a statistical perspective, this 
practice may have been surprisingly sound. Empirical bankruptcy research 
since that time has suggested that there may be a correlation between 
supporting children and financial distress.297  
Even the very classification that motivated the original passage of the 
ECOA is not exempt. A contemporary study analyzed data from several 
creditors’ applicant pools and found that including marital status in credit-
scoring models did improve their accuracy.298 Use of this classification was 
restricted nonetheless. On this issue, regulators have had to walk a particu-
larly fine line in weighing antidiscrimination goals against lenders’ data 
needs. On the one hand, one major purpose of the law was to change the 
creditor practice of differentiating among women of different marital 
statuses.299 On the other hand, state marriage law does impact creditors’ 
collection rights, and the ECOA preserves access to certain marital infor-
mation.300 
In general, this is an area of law that requires careful balancing of the 
benefits of more accurate credit scoring with the harms caused by mathema-
tically penalizing certain groups whose access to credit policymakers want to 
ensure. These two interests conflict frequently, and in many cases, policy-
makers have chosen discrimination prevention. If there is in fact a relation-
ship between past coerced debt and credit risk, victims of domestic violence 
 
value.”); id. § 202.6(b)(2)(iv) (“In any system of evaluating creditworthiness, a creditor may con-
sider the age of an elderly applicant when such age is used to favor the elderly applicant in 
extending credit.”). 
295 Id. § 202.6(b)(3). 
296 See Susan Smith Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and Its Effects, 1981 
WIS. L. REV. 655, 659-60 (discussing a Senate report naming creditors’ requests for information 
about birth control use as one of thirteen common types of credit discrimination based on sex and 
marital status). 
297 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1013 (2002) (finding 
that “[t]he presence of children in a household—with nothing more—increases the likelihood that 
the household will be in bankruptcy by three-fold”). 
298 James F. Smith, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: A Cost/Benefit Analysis, 32 J. 
FIN. 609, 618 (1977). 
299 The National Commission on Consumer Finance made findings about the barriers that 
single and married women faced in obtaining credit that were influential in the ECOA’s passage. 
See id. at 609 (“The public record on the issue of the availability of credit to women, which led to 
the Act, goes back to hearings held by the National Commission on Consumer Finance on May 
22-23, 1972.”). 
300 For example, creditors may ask about an applicant’s spouse or former spouse when the 
applicant lives in a community-property state. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)(2)(iv).  
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would have a particularly strong claim to this kind of discrimination 
protection. The moment of leaving an abusive relationship is critical; it deter-
mines whether victims and their children can establish independent house-
holds apart from the abuser. Access to the mainstream of American 
financial life, through credit, employment, and housing, is crucial to their 
success. 
2. Determining What Debt Is Past 
An important component of a system that separates past and present 
debt is the process for determining whether a debt is still collectable. 
Despite their poor performance in maintaining consumer credit files 
generally, the CRAs are the logical entities to make this classification. They 
have the best access to the relevant information, and indeed already provide 
much of it on current credit reports. The main statutory amendments 
needed on this point would be those designed to ensure that the CRAs 
labeled debts correctly. 
There are three main ways in which a consumer ceases to be liable for a 
debt: payment in full, bankruptcy, or other legal defenses to collection. 
CRAs already report full payment and account closures on credit reports.301 
It would be administratively simple for CRAs to block any certified coerced 
debt that would have otherwise been listed as paid.  
As for bankruptcies, the CRAs have procedures for being notified of 
them.302 It should also be simple for CRAs to determine which debts were 
discharged by a bankruptcy, to block those debts when they were coerced, 
and to list the bankruptcy on the consumer’s report instead. However, the 
CRAs do not have a good track record here. They frequently report debts 
discharged by bankruptcy as currently outstanding.303 
Debts that are uncollectable for other reasons present the most difficult 
case. This category consists of debts such as those for which the statute of 
limitations has run or which a court has found invalid. When a court of law 
has ruled on a debt, the CRAs should receive notification through their 
existing procedures for downloading public records, although there is some 
anecdotal evidence that even this type of court record is sometimes not 
 
301 CRAs are required to report a consumer’s voluntary closure of an account. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681c(e) (2006). 
302 See WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 96, § 4.3.2.5.1 (discussing CRA procedures for ob-
taining public records). 
303 See, e.g., In re Sommersdorf, 139 B.R. 700, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (“Such a notation 
on a credit report is, in fact, just the type of creditor shenanigans intended to be prohibited by the 
automatic stay.”). 
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enough to trump a furnisher’s continued reporting of a debt.304 The statute 
of limitations scenario is trickier, because the CRAs currently have no 
system for tracking these expirations. The CRAs are in fact allowed to 
report all debts for a period of seven years,305 and the law makes no exception 
for limitations running.306 This makes sense, because expired debts are still 
useful as evidence of payment history even after they cease to be relevant to 
the question of current indebtedness. Requiring the CRAs to track this 
information might be burdensome because limitations periods vary widely 
from state to state.307  
To facilitate the proper handling of these issues, it might be necessary 
for the CFPB to promulgate a form through which consumers could 
communicate the legal status of their coerced debts. This could be part of 
the document that certified the debts as coerced. After the family court had 
listed all the debts that it determined were coerced, the consumer would 
mark which ones were no longer legally binding. The CRAs would be 
required to accept the consumer’s classifications unless they specifically 
determined otherwise. Setting the consumer’s categorization as the default 
would prevent the CRAs from making haphazard decisions without exam-
ining the evidence, but would enable them to correct the record in cases in 
which the consumer designations were inaccurate. 
B. Outstanding Debt 
Blocking outstanding coerced debt on victims’ credit reports presents a 
more complex case. Because I do not propose altering liability for coerced 
debt, any blocking of outstanding debt would result in credit reports that 
were inaccurate as to the consumer’s outstanding obligations. Information 
about current debt is important because it tells the potential creditor 
whether the consumer is likely to have funds available to pay the proposed 
debt. A consumer who already owes large sums may not be able to pay back 
the potential creditor, no matter how strong a debtor she otherwise would 
be. In addition, knowledge of current liabilities enables a creditor to predict 
 
304 See Wu, supra note 17, at 174-75 (discussing the credit bureaus’ failure to forward docu-
ments to furnishers, which can lead to incorrect outcomes). 
305 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(4). 
306 Compare id. § 1681c(a)(2) (allowing credit reporting agencies to include information about 
“civil suits, civil judgments, and records of arrest” until the governing statute of limitations has 
expired, if this period is longer than seven years), with id. § 1681c(a)(4) (making no such exception 
for the statute of limitations). 
307 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (2012) (requiring an action to be commenced within six 
years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (2011) (three years); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-2-725 (West 
2012) (fifteen years). 
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how many other creditors would be vying for a debtor’s assets and income 
in the event of default.  
Thus, I am narrowly tailoring this proposal to cover the credit report 
users whose services victims of coerced debt most urgently need: employers, 
landlords, and basic utility companies. These users have different needs and 
expectations regarding credit reporting, which, on balance, are outweighed 
by the needs of victims leaving abusive relationships to establish independ-
ent households. This Section will discuss, first, the statutory changes 
necessary to effect this reform, and second, a policy analysis that balances 
the interests and needs of employers, landlords, and utilities with those of 
victims of coerced debt. 
1. Statutory Changes 
The statutory implementation of this change would be straightforward. 
The FCRA defines what types of parties may access consumer credit 
reports in a section entitled “Permissible purposes of consumer reports.”308 
This provision includes one subsection that covers lenders,309 another that 
covers employers,310 and a catch-all subsection that covers landlords and 
utilities.311 The FCRA could provide a separate subsection for landlords and 
utilities, as it already does for employers. The subsection might state that all 
three types of entities have more limited rights vis-à-vis those consumers 
who have submitted a certification for the blocking of coerced debt. The 
statute would also likely need to state that credit reports blocked in accord-
ance with that section would still be considered “accurate” under other parts 
of the statute.312 
The CRAs have the technical ability to provide credit reports containing 
different information to different types of creditors. They are already 
required by law to do so in another situation: when relatively large amounts 
of money are at stake. Normally, there is a designated period during which 
 
308 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 
309 Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A).  
310 Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(B). 
311 Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(F)(i). Some courts have also considered landlords to be covered as credi-
tors under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A). See, e.g., Ferguson v. Park City Mobile Homes, No. 89-
1909, 1989 WL 111916, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1989) (concluding that a lease was a “credit 
transaction within the meaning of the FCRA”); Cotto v. Jenney, 721 F. Supp. 5, 6 (D. Mass. 
1989) (finding that the FCRA applied to a report that a landlord’s association prepared on the 
plaintiff). 
312 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer 
report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the infor-
mation concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”). 
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certain items may remain on a consumer’s credit report. For example, 
records of accounts placed for collections expire after seven years,313 while 
the record of a bankruptcy expires after ten.314 However, if the user is a 
potential creditor or insurer considering a transaction reasonably expected 
to involve at least $150,000, or a potential employer hiring for a position 
with a salary of at least $75,000, these expiration periods do not apply.315 In 
addition, as discussed in Part II, the CRAs already provide two different 
sets of reports to consumers and potential creditors. 
2. Policy Considerations for Employers, Landlords, and Utilities 
The use of credit reports by employers, landlords, and basic utility com-
panies is the most urgent issue facing victims of coerced debt. Leaving an 
abusive relationship is a make-or-break situation. Someone who may have 
been forcibly kept out of the workforce316 or kept financially illiterate317 is 
faced with the formidable challenge of starting a self-sufficient household.318 
If she fails at this task, she and her children may end up back with the 
abuser.319 Thus, the moment when someone attempts to leave an abusive 
relationship is the critical time for society at large to affect the rate of 
domestic violence. Making it possible for victims to obtain jobs and housing 
at that moment may very well reduce domestic violence. 
Good credit has become an increasingly important component of basic 
economic citizenship, as more employers, landlords, and basic utility 
companies have incorporated credit reports into their standard practices. 
Employer use of credit reports has risen dramatically in the past several 
years—60% of employers conducted credit background checks on at least 
some job applicants in 2010.320 Services that provide credit checks specifical-
ly to landlords321 and utilities322 have also proliferated. Each of these three 
 
313 Id. § 1681c(a)(4). 
314 Id. § 1681c(a)(1). 
315 Id. § 1681c(b)(1)–(3). 
316 See Littwin, supra note 1, at 953 n.3 (citing reports and articles on the negative effect 
domestic violence has on victims’ employment). 
317 See id. at 981-86 (discussing the abuser’s financial control as the foundation of coerced debt). 
318 See id. at 1000 (stating that domestic violence can “interfere with [the victim’s] ability to 
obtain jobs and housing and thus to become economically self-sufficient”).  
319 See id. (“[A]n inability to establish a financially viable household apart from the abuser . . . 
increases the risk that survivors who have left will return.”). 
320 SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT: CREDIT BACKGROUND 
CHECKS 1 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Documents/ 
CCFlier_FINAL.pdf. 
321 See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, A Credit Score That Tracks You More Closely, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 3, 2011, at B1 (describing a new company that offers rental payment history in credit checks); 
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types of institutions has different needs for credit data and different 
expectations regarding regulation. I address them in turn. 
a. Employers 
Employers are the most straightforward case of the three. They are not 
creditors of their employees,323 which makes their interest in credit data 
more limited than that of other entities. Employers’ access to credit reports 
is already controversial, even without adding coerced debt into the mix. 
And employers are already covered separately from creditors under the 
FCRA, which imposes additional restrictions on them.324  
There is an active debate over whether employers should have access to 
credit reports at all.325 Eight states have banned employers from running 
credit checks in at least some situations,326 and several more have had bills 
 
Landlord Credit Check–FAQs, AAA CREDIT SCREENING SERVICES, http://www.aaacredit.net/ 
landlord-credit-check.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (offering credit and background screening 
particularly to landlords); Welcome, DONOTRENTTO.COM, http://www.donotrentto.com (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2012) (allowing landlords to determine the suitability of potential renters); Quality 
Tenant Screening Center, LANDLORD.COM, http://www.landlord.com/qts_faqs.htm (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2012) (offering screening services to help landlords fill their vacancies). 
322 See, e.g., About Us, NAT’L CONSUMER TELECOM & UTIL. EXCHANGE, http://www. 
nctue.com/about-us (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (describing itself as a “credit data exchange 
service” for the telecommunications and utility industries). 
323 Employers are actually debtors of their employees. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
324 The most important FCRA provision requires that employers obtain written releases 
from employees before ordering credit checks. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). Employers 
must certify to the CRA that they have obtained this permission. Id. § 1681b(b)(1)(A). They are 
also required to give employees notice both before and after taking adverse action. Id. 
§§ 1681b(3)(A) & 1681m(a). 
325 See, e.g., Jeremy M. Simon, TransUnion Asked to Stop Selling Credit Reports to Employers, 
CREDITCARDS.COM (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/transunion-credit- 
report-employment-hiring-decision-1270.php (discussing an online petition asking TransUnion to 
end its sale of credit reports to employers); see also Use of Credit Information Beyond Lending: Issues 
and Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. app. 187-88 (2010) [hereinafter Use of Credit Information] (testimony of 
Chi Chi Wu, Staff Att’y, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.) (discussing the problems with allowing 
employers access to credit information); Kelly Gallagher, Note, Rethinking the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act: When Requesting Credit Reports for “Employment Purposes” Goes Too Far, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 
1617 (2006) (proposing that Congress limit employers’ ability to use personal credit information in 
hiring decisions). 
326 Use of Credit Information in Employment 2012 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLA-
TURES (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/use-of-credit-info-in-employ 
-2012-legis.aspx; see also, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 659A.320 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.020 (2007). 
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under consideration in recent years.327 Much of this legislative activity has 
been in reaction to the economic downturn that began in 2008. Policy-
makers are concerned that consumers forced out of work by the recession 
will become unemployable because their credit reports will reflect their 
inability to pay their bills while unemployed.328 As a union policy report 
put it, American consumers are “behind on their bills because they don’t 
have a job, but they can’t get a job because they’re behind on their bills.”329 
Widespread use of credit reports in employment decisions could lead to a 
class of consumers who are permanently unemployable. In addition, there is 
a civil rights issue. People of color are disproportionately likely to have low 
credit scores,330 so civil rights officials worry that employer use of credit 
scores has a disparate impact on these populations, or could even be used as 
a pretext for discriminatory hiring decisions.331 
To the extent that employers do have a legitimate interest in potential 
employee credit histories, it is almost entirely predictive. They have a 
 
327 See Use of Credit Information, supra note 325, at app. 188 (testimony of Chi Chi Wu) 
(noting that eighteen states and the District of Columbia have bills pending that would limit 
employers’ access to credit information). 
328 See Byron Acohido, Credit Checks Used in Hiring, USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 2011, at B1 (stating 
that the legislative activity in this area is in response to the recession). 
329 UNITE HERE, EMPLOYMENT CREDIT CHECKS: A CATCH-22 FOR AMERICAN 
WORKERS 1, available at http://www.creditcatch22.org/CreditCatch-22Report.pdf. 
330 See, e.g., Use of Credit Information, supra note 325, at app. 189-90 (testimony of Chi Chi 
Wu) (noting racial disparities); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND 
AFFORDABILITY OF CREDIT 80-81 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/RptCongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf (tracking the variations in scores among ethnic 
groups); MATT FELLOWES, BROOKINGS INST., CREDIT SCORES, REPORTS, AND GETTING 
AHEAD IN AMERICA 9 (2006) available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/ 
reports/2006/5/childrenfamilies%20fellowes/20060501_creditscores (“Counties with relatively high 
proportions of racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to have lower average credit scores.”); 
Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, 2004 FED. RES. BULL. 297, 321, 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/summer04_credit.pdf (finding an 
increased incidence of errors in minority credit reports); Raphael W. Bostic et al., Hitting the Wall: 
Credit As an Impediment to Homeownership 13 ( Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., 
Working Paper No. 482, 2004), available at http://realestate.wharton.upenn.edu/research/ 
papers/full/482.pdf (finding that ethnic minorities had lower estimated credit scores). 
331 See Acohido, supra note 328 (reporting allegations that “employers are unfairly using 
credit histories to weed out the down and out, especially people of color”); Dianna B. Johnston, 
Assistant Legal Counsel, EEOC, Informal Discussion Letter re Title VII: Employer Use of Credit 
Checks, Mar. 9, 2010, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2010/titlevii-employer-
creditck.html (noting that, because Title VII prohibits practices that disproportionately screen out 
racial minorities, if use of credit information does so, it would be illegal); Pre-Employment Inquiries 
and Credit Rating or Economic Status, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_ 
credit.cfm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (stating that such inquiries “generally should be avoided” 
because of their disparate impact on women and minorities). 
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limited current liabilities interest, because their employees do not owe them 
money. This means that data about outstanding debt provide employees 
with little value beyond what they can learn from past debt, so the impact 
of restricting their access to information about outstanding coerced debt 
would be minimal. 
Among the reasons why employers seek employee credit data, the only 
one that would be affected by my proposal is the belief that employees with 
high levels of unpaid debt are more likely to steal from their employers. 
This idea, however, rests on assumptions that are not supported by the 
scant empirical research in this area. In a recent survey by the Society for 
Human Resource Management (SHRM), 45% of polled human resources 
representatives said that the reason they performed credit checks was to 
“reduce/prevent theft[,] embezzlement[, and] other criminal activity.”332 
The logic is that an “employee who is heavily burdened by debt could be 
more likely to embezzle or steal”333 in order to make up the shortfall on her 
personal balance sheet. This reason would apply to victims of coerced debt 
because, even though they were not the ones who incurred a blocked debt, 
they would still be liable for paying it. If one were motivated to steal to pay 
one’s liabilities, it would not matter how the debts were created.  
The problem with this theory is that there is no research supporting 
it.334 There appear to have been only two studies ever conducted on the 
matter, and neither found a link between debt and theft. The first was a 
1983 study, which found that “employees who reported having personal eco-
nomic problems were no more theft-prone that those who did not.”335 The 
other, conducted in 2003, found “no benefit from using credit history to 
 
332 SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING—THE USE OF CRED-
IT BACKGROUND CHECKS IN HIRING DECISIONS 10 (2012), available at http://www.shrm.org/ 
Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/CriminalBackgroundCheck.aspx (click on “click here”). 
333 David Lorango, Why Do New Employers Need Your Credit Score?, EHOW, http://www. 
ehow.com/facts_5748998_do-employers-need-credit-score_.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).  
334 A 2006 law review note did a similar search and obtained the same results that I did: a 
plethora of popular-press and trade articles advising employers to run credit checks to prevent 
employee theft but no empirical support for this recommendation. See Gallagher, supra note 325, 
at 1595 n.3 (“Despite articles in business and trade journals stating that ‘there is obviously a 
reason’ to perform a credit check on bookkeepers and other individuals handling cash, . . . none 
that I have found reference any data suggesting any correlation between credit score and job 
performance or likelihood to steal from an employer.”); see also Use of Credit Information, supra note 
325, at app. 191 (testimony of Chi Chi Wu) (“There is no evidence showing that people with weak 
credit are more likely to be bad employees or to steal from their bosses.”). 
335 Richard C. Hollinger, Why Do Our Employees Steal?, in RETAIL CRIME, SECURITY, AND 
LOSS PREVENTION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC REFERENCE 608, 608 (Charles A. Sennewald & 
John H. Christman eds., 2008). Social scientists have developed a model of employee theft, and 
“motivation” is only one of three contributing factors. The other two are “opportunity” and 
“deterrence.” Of the three, deterrence is the most important. Id. 
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predict employee performance or turnover.”336 Even a CRA spokesperson 
recently conceded in legislative testimony that there was not any evidence 
for this link.337 
There is also a more general version of this theory, but it is not impli-
cated by my policy proposal. Approximately 12% of the hiring managers in 
the SHRM poll said that they used credit reports to evaluate “overall 
trustworthiness.”338 The theory is that if a person is responsible in one 
sector of her life, she will be responsible in another. Or it can be framed 
more specifically for finance-oriented jobs—the category for which employ-
ers are most likely to run credit checks339—and stated as the proposition 
that a person who has successfully managed his own finances is more likely 
to have success managing a business’s.340 But as many commentators have 
pointed out in the general debate over employer access to credit data, 
factors beyond an individual’s control can lower her credit rating.341 This 
reasoning applies even more strongly to coerced debt, which will have been 
certified by a court as not belonging to the person on whose credit report it 
appears. 
Employers also use credit checks to avoid potential liability for torts 
such as negligent hiring342 and to check for misrepresentation of employee 
credentials,343 but my proposal would not harm employers on either of these 
grounds. An employer likely would not be held liable for information to 
 
336 Laura Koppes Bryan & Jerry K. Palmer, Do Job Applicant Credit Histories Predict Perfor-
mance Appraisal Ratings or Termination Decisions?, 15 PSYCHOLOGIST-MANAGER J. 106, 123 
(2012). 
337 Liz Weston, Could You Be Fired for Bad Credit?, MSN MONEY (Sept. 24, 2010 9:00 AM), 
http://money.msn.com/Credit-Rating/could-you-be-fired-for-bad-credit-weston.aspx (quoting the 
testimony of Eric Rosenberg, state government liaison for TransUnion, to Oregon legislators, “At 
this point we don’t have any research to show any statistical correlation between what’s in 
somebody’s credit report and their job performance or their likelihood to commit fraud.”). 
338 SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 332, at 10. 
339 Id. at 16.  
340 As one industrial psychologist put it, “If you cannot organize your finances, how are you 
going to responsibly organize yourself for a company?” Diane E. Lewis, Qualification: Must Have a 
Good Credit History, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 5, 2006, at E1. 
341 See, e.g., Use of Credit Information, supra note 325, at app. 191 (testimony of Chi Chi Wu) 
(noting that “many people end up with a negative credit rating for reasons they can’t control”). 
342 In the 2012 SHRM poll, 22% of human resource managers listed reducing liability for 
negligent hiring as the primary reason for using credit checks. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. 
MGMT., supra note 332, at 10; see also Gallagher, supra note 325, at 1599 (listing liability concerns 
as one motivating factor in employers’ decisions to obtain credit reports for potential employees). 
343 See John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, Whom To Hire: Rampant Misrepresen-
tations of Credentials Mandate the Prudent Employer Make Informed Hiring Decisions, 39 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (characterizing employees’ misrepresentation of credentials as an 
“epidemic”). 
  
422 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 363 
 
which it was denied access on an employee’s credit report, and blocking 
coerced debt would not interfere with employers’ verification of items on 
job applicant resumes. 
Interestingly, the one current liabilities interest that employers may 
have in knowing about employees’ current coerced debt is not among the 
reasons that employers give for ordering employee credit reports.344 The 
issue is the potential effect of collection attempts and financial stress on the 
job performance of heavily indebted employees. When a debt is in default, 
creditors can and do call the debtor at work to increase their leverage and 
thereby increase their odds of repayment.345 In addition, defaulting debtors 
may have their cars repossessed346 or find themselves unable to concentrate 
on their work.347 These factors can therefore have negative effects on 
debtors’ employers.  
However, just as in the credit context,348 there are already many other 
factors that could negatively affect a person’s job performance about which 
employers are prohibited from inquiring. For example, employers are 
denied access to information about health diagnoses,349 mental health 
issues,350 and child-bearing intentions,351 despite these conditions’ potential 
effects on future job performance. These policies were enacted because our 
society prioritizes a level playing field in the job market over certain 
employer interests. Policymakers have determined that society as a whole 
benefits from a work force that does not discriminate against, for example, 
diabetics, people who have suffered from depression, and women of child-
 
344 See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 332, at 10 (not listing financial stress). 
345 The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits “debt collectors” from calling debtors at 
work, but “debt collectors” is defined to include only third-party collections, not collections by the 
creditor itself. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2006) (defining “debt collector” to include only an entity 
that “collects . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another”); id. § 1692c(a)(3) 
(prohibiting a “debt collector” from contacting a consumer at his or her workplace if the debt 
collector has reason to know that the employer prohibits such communication). 
346 See U.C.C. § 9-609 (2012) (allowing secured creditors to repossess their collateral as long 
as the repossession does not involve a breach of the peace).  
347 See, e.g., Deborah Thorne, Women’s Work, Women’s Worry? Debt Management in Financially 
Distressed Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 136, 151 (Kathe-
rine Porter ed., 2012) (linking financial hardship to increased stress, insomnia, and depression). 
348 See supra subsection III.A.1. 
349 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 2008) (“[A] covered entity shall not conduct a 
medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an 
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.”). 
350 Id. 
351 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (amending Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act to state that the prohibition of discrimination “because of sex” or “on 
the basis of sex” “include[s], but [is] not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions”). 
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bearing age. Victims of coerced debt need this same protection. Otherwise, 
barriers to entering the work force could make it prohibitively difficult for 
them to become sufficiently financially independent to remain free of 
abusive relationships. 
b. Utilities  
Unlike employers, utility providers and landlords are creditors; their 
customers and tenants owe them money. These entities therefore have a 
strong interest in viewing their applicants’ credit reports because other 
outstanding debts could affect their ability to pay. If an applicant is paying 
down a large coerced debt, the money she uses for these payments will not 
be available for her utility bills or rent. Thus, an outstanding coerced debt 
that is blocked from the consumer’s credit report could have a negative 
impact on her utility company or landlord. Nevertheless, because of the 
essential nature of the services they provide, these entities already have 
reduced rights and expectations when compared with financial-sector 
creditors, and on balance, it is reasonable to ask them to bear the risk of 
remaining ignorant of applicants’ coerced debts. 
In addition to providing fundamental services, basic utilities, such as gas 
and electric companies, are natural monopolies.352 These two factors 
combine to make the public utility industry among the most highly regulated 
in the United States. The heavy governance of utility providers is so 
normalized that commentators discussing financial institutions frequently 
contrast them with utilities to show why regulation should not apply in the 
financial sector.353 
Utility companies’ ability to adjust for the riskiness of individual cus-
tomers is already correspondingly compromised. They are, for the most 
 
352 Public utility monopolies survive because “[t]he high fixed costs of building a plant are 
such that no second company can enter the market at a cost below that which the incumbent can 
charge for its services, even if allowed to do so as a matter of law.” Richard A. Epstein, Durbin's 
Folly: The Erratic Course of Debit Card Markets?, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2011, at 58, 66. 
353 See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Unconscionability: 
The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest Rates Under the Unconscionability 
Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 789 n.343 (1994) (rejecting for lenders one approach to setting 
usury rates, that of “setting a ceiling consistent with industry risks and costs, as a public utilities 
commission would do”); Epstein, supra note 352, at 67 (“[T]here are . . . major differences between 
the debit interchange market and standard public utility regulation . . . . [R]ate regulation here is 
imposed on what is a virtual competitive industry, where any pocket of monopoly power is tiny 
relative to the systemic long-term territorial monopoly of the standard public utility.”); see also 
Jarret C. Oeltjen, Usury: Utilitarian or Useless?, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 167, 222 (1975) (“To 
attempt to regulate credit as a public utility would be a major error . . . .” (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting Milton Friedman, Defense of Usury, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1970, at 79)).  
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part, not allowed to select their customers354 or to price discriminate.355 
They must follow frequently elaborate procedures before terminating 
existing customers,356 and in many states, they must regularly notify their 
customers of their rights to fight disconnection.357 Thus, utility providers 
already engage in massive cross-subsidization—from the financially stable 
customers to the poor, from the urban to the rural,358 and even from the 
winter customers to the summer.359 Adding victims of coerced debt to the 
mix would not disrupt this business model. 
Utilities would, however, experience some harm from the blocking of 
outstanding coerced debt. One of the few tools utilities may use to manage 
customer risk is demanding upfront deposits,360 and it is in the process of 
determining deposit requirements that utility companies run credit 
checks.361 In my preliminary study of coerced debt, the DV advocates I 
interviewed pointed to high deposits as an important barrier to their clients’ 
 
354 Public utilities have a “duty to serve,” which “means that utilities must provide service to 
any member of the public living within the utility’s service area who has applied for service and is 
willing to pay for the service and comply with the utility’s rules and regulations.” NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., DEALING WITH UTILITY COMPANIES 1 (2010), available at http://www. 
nclc.org/images/pdf/older_consumers/consumer_facts/cf_dealing_with_utility_companies.pdf. 
355 For this reason, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook refer to them as “maladjusting” or 
“quasi-involuntary” creditors in their study of the ability of different types of creditors to risk-
adjust under proposals for private, corporate bankruptcy regimes. Elizabeth Warren & Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1197, 1216, 1230 (2005). 
356 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 354, at 2 (outlining the many steps a utility 
must take before terminating service). 
357 JOHN HOWAT & JULIA DEVANTHARY, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PUBLIC SER-
VICE COMMISSION CONSUMER PROTECTION RULES AND REGULATIONS 5 (2006), available 
at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/energy_utility_telecom/additional_resources/resource_guide 
.pdf (“Some states require companies to regularly provide information to consumers regarding 
payment assistance and the right to file a consumer complaint or dispute billing amounts.”). 
358 See id. (“Th[e] obligation to serve prevents utility companies from choosing to serve only 
the most profitable customers and geographic areas.”). 
359 In Massachusetts, for example, “utilities are prohibited from terminating service between 
November 15 and April 15 in households were [sic] there is financial hardship.” Id. at 7. 
360 See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, supra note 355, at 1230 (“Most public utilities make some 
effort to protect themselves from risk of loss by requiring deposits prior to initiating service and 
by threatening to cut off service if the debtor becomes delinquent.”). 
361 The NCLC conducted a study with regulatory officials from ten states to learn about 
their utilities’ written rules and informal practices. One finding was that “[t]he common theme 
that state [public utility companies] reported was that utilities tend to use payment history with 
past providers as a basis for evaluating whether to impose a security deposit.” HOWAT & 
DEVANTHARY, supra note 357, at 11; see also Robert W. Seifert, Home Sick: How Medical Debt 
Undermines Housing Security, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 325, 343 (2007) (“In some cases, people with 
low credit scores have been required to pay higher utility deposits.”). 
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economic self-sufficiency.362 But even in determining deposit requirements, 
utilities’ freedom is not absolute. In several states, they have discretion to 
determine whether to require a deposit, but not to determine the amount.363 
Because utility deposit-setting practices are already so constrained, remov-
ing one piece of information from utilities’ purview would not make a major 
difference in deposit requests. If blocking coerced debt were to become 
costly for utilities, they could use that as an argument for small rate increas-
es and spread the loss across the entire body of utility customers. 
c. Landlords 
Landlords present the most difficult case of the three actors because, like 
utilities, they are creditors, but unlike utilities, they cannot compensate for 
potential losses through the power of monopoly status. Landlords do, 
however, control access to an essential resource without which survivors of 
domestic violence cannot establish independence. This issue has been 
recognized by the national and state laws that prohibit property managers 
from discriminating on the basis of domestic violence history.  
The main reason to apply a full credit-reporting block to landlords is to 
prevent victims of coerced debt from becoming part of the class of “un-
houseables.”364 This refers to an emerging category of people who cannot 
obtain rental housing because of a disqualifying event, such as an eviction, 
criminal record, or period of homelessness.365 If they do find housing, they 
often have to pay application fees to several landlords before obtaining it.366 
Since this problem has become more prevalent as background screening has 
 
362 See Littwin, supra note 1, at 1001 (describing an interview with a lawyer whose client was 
required to pay a $1500 deposit to turn on utilities in her apartment). 
363 See HOWAT & DEVANTHARY, supra note 357, at 11 (“Unlike the unencumbered decisions 
made about whether to demand security deposits, states in the sample reported rather narrow 
parameters for determining the amount that a ‘risky’ customer must pay. The upper limits on 
deposits did not exceed twice the highest bill at the address and hovered more often around twice 
the average bill.”). 
364 This term appears to have been coined by Eric Dunn and Marina Grabchuk. Eric Dunn 
& Marina Grabchuk, Background Checks and Social Effects: Contemporary Residential Tenant-Screening 
Problems in Washington State, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 319, 337 (2010). 
365 See id. 
366 See Jonathan Grant, Tenant Screening: A Housing Barrier for the 21st Century, SOLID 
GROUND BLOG ( Jan. 21, 2010), http://solidgroundblog.wordpress.com/2010/01/21/tenant-screen 
ing-a-housing-barrier-for-the-21st-century (“Currently residents in Washington State are hit with 
repeated fees in background checks for housing applications, often paying hundreds of dol-
lars . . . .”). 
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become increasingly accessible,367 it is important to remove victims of 
coerced debt from this category. 
The legal system has already recognized the crucial role of providing 
access to housing for DV victims and survivors by preventing landlords 
from discriminating against them in many circumstances. My proposal 
simply fills an important gap in this protection. Recently, lawyers have 
argued that housing discrimination against DV survivors violates the Fair 
Housing Act’s (FHA) ban on gender discrimination.368 This use of the 
FHA is still relatively novel, and there is currently only one federal case on 
point.369 Additionally, since 2005, the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) has provided unambiguous antidiscrimination protection for DV 
victims and survivors living in federally subsidized housing.370 Moreover, 
six states and the District of Columbia have enacted provisions that explic-
itly prevent discrimination against victims of domestic violence in all types 
of housing.371 An overlapping group of twelve states and the District of 
Columbia have also enacted provisions that allow DV victims to break their 
leases without penalty in order to escape abuse.372 These statutes may 
 
367 “[T]echnological advances gave rise to the tenant screening industry, revolutionizing the 
largely manual business of gathering public and financial records into one that is now primarily 
automated.” HOUSING LINK, TENANT SCREENING AGENCIES IN THE TWIN CITIES: AN 
OVERVIEW OF TENANT SCREENING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON RENTERS 9 
(2004), available at http://www.housinglink.org/Files/Tenant_Screening.pdf. 
368 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o discriminate against any 
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of 
services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 
national origin.”). 
369 See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005) (allowing a case to 
proceed to a jury on grounds of alleged discrimination on the basis of religion and gender when 
the landlord evicted a tenant following an incident of domestic violence). 
370 This part of VAWA covers all Section 8 units and most public housing projects. HUD 
Programs: Violence Against Women Act Conforming Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,336 (Nov. 28, 
2008) (to be codified in scattered sections of 24 C.F.R). 
371 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-40-107.5(5)(c)(I) (2011); IOWA CODE §§ 562A.27A, 
562B.25A (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-33 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-1, et. seq. (2012); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.130 (2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 106.50 (West 2012). See also NAT’L 
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HOUSING 2, 
available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/Housing_.pdf (collecting state law provisions that protect 
DV survivors’ access to housing). 
372 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946.7 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453 (2011); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.352 (West 2012); see also SANDRA PARK, FAIR HOUSING FOR 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 22 (2008), available at http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/ 
ACLU_Park_Webinar_Gender_Discrimination.pdf (listing the laws of Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, New York, Oregon, 
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin as jurisdictions that allow early lease terminations by DV 
victims). 
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indeed cause landlords some economic harm,373 but policymakers have 
determined that DV victims’ need for housing and safety outweighs that 
risk. The same policy considerations apply to victims of coerced debt. 
It is important, however, to put this potential harm to landlords in per-
spective. Consumers tend to prioritize their rental payments,374 and they are 
particularly likely to prioritize rent over credit card debt.375 Therefore, 
landlords are likely to fare well in payment competitions with financial-
sector creditors, many of whom will be collecting on past debt rather than 
offering future credit by the time a consumer is in the position of having to 
choose. For current tenants, landlords are always offering future benefits in 
the form of continued residence on the property.  
Property managers also typically require one- to three-months’ rent up-
front,376 which has the effect of forcing tenants to immediately internalize 
their rental costs. If a consumer could not afford the rent—for example 
because she was making payments on a coerced debt that was blocked on 
her credit report—she would likely not be able to afford the large initial 
payments required to sign a lease. Accordingly, there is a relatively limited 
set of circumstances in which a landlord would initially rent to a victim of 
coerced debt and then later be harmed by her inability to pay. This would 
occur only when the consumer was not paying a coerced debt at the time 
she began the lease but became required to pay it—for example by a lawsuit 
or garnishment—during the course of the tenancy. Nevertheless, there 
could be an exception for small landlords who cannot spread potential losses 
among a large number of tenants, perhaps modeled on the exception in 
the FHA.377 
 
373 For example, former abusive partners of survivors who have obtained housing under the 
antidiscrimination laws may stalk victims and cause property damage or disturb neighbors. The 
early lease termination provisions may cause landlords some economic harm when they cannot 
easily replace the former tenant. 
374 See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 37, at 478 (describing how low-income women in a small 
study prioritized their rent payments above other expenses). 
375 Id. 
376 Moreover, these amounts are usually predetermined rather than calculated in response to 
a rental applicant’s credit history. See, e.g., How Much Security Deposit Can a Landlord Charge? What 
Can It Be Used for?, NOLO (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/leases-rental-
agreements-faq-29104-4.html (noting that landlords may ask for one or two month’s rent just for 
the security deposit).  
377 The FHA exception applies to “any single-family house sold or rented by an owner: 
Provided, That such private individual owner does not own more than three such single-family 
houses at any one time” and “rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or 
intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the 
owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3603(b)(1)–(2) (2006). 
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In addition to potential nonpayment of rent, there are other harms that 
landlords may experience as a result of renting to victims of coerced debt. 
As victims of domestic violence, they may be subject to stalking and 
harassment, which may result in damage to property or disturb other 
tenants. However, these concerns apply to all victims of domestic violence, 
not just to victims of coerced debt, and the decision about whether to allow 
landlords access to information about rental applicants’ DV histories should 
be made on its own merits. Otherwise, some victims of domestic violence 
(those with coerced debt) will have less access to housing than others (those 
without coerced debt) for reasons unrelated to the concerns that landlords 
may have about them as tenants. My view is that the equities balance in 
favor of DV victims. Constraining victims’ access to housing—which in 
cities with tight housing markets may mean eliminating their access to 
housing—creates barriers for victims attempting to establish independent 
households, which in turn, increases the difficulty of leaving abusive 
relationships. But here, too, I would not object to an exception for small 
landlords who may not be able to bear these risks. 
Finally, the administrative implementation of this proposal would not 
be difficult for property managers. Rather than ordering credit reports 
directly, most landlords use specialized tenant-screening services,378 which 
provide additional information and recommendations. As specialists, these 
services are very familiar with credit reporting law and could easily adjust. 
In sum, employers, utility companies, and landlords have characteristics 
that distinguish them from financial-sector creditors and make the removal 
of current liabilities information from their purview less problematic than it 
would be for lenders. On the other side of the equation, the jobs and 
services they provide are essential for victims of coerced debt who are 
attempting to start new households apart from the abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
When one considers how important credit reports have become, the 
state of the current system for compiling them and overseeing their accura-
cy is shocking. The CRAs use loose matching algorithms that virtually 
ensure errors and enable fraud, and they have no meaningful process for 
correcting the inaccuracies that occur. At some point, these conditions may 
lead to demands for reform, although the “VIP” system that provides higher 
quality service to people with a better ability to insist on change probably 
 
378 A 2004 study of tenant-screening practices in Minnesota found that 72% of property 
managers used tenant-screening agencies. HOUSING LINK, supra note 367, at 6. 
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acts as a brake on any such calls. If and when reform happens, victims of 
coerced debt will benefit. 
In the meantime, the best approach is to remove decisions about coerced 
debt from CRAs. Since CRAs cannot meaningfully evaluate a consumer’s 
claim that she is not the same person as someone with a similar address and 
the same first initial, they cannot possibly evaluate the much more complex 
factual assertions that surround coerced debt. 
Moving decisionmaking about coerced debt to family courts does place 
more pressure on the existing processes for addressing domestic violence, 
but these systems also provide grounds for optimism. In a relatively short 
period of time, the modern domestic violence movement has successfully 
created a paradigmatic shift379 that has changed the terms of the discussion 
and brought vast improvements to nearly every type of institution that 
serves victims and survivors.380 If change can come to a system that was 
shielded by centuries of common law,381 it can come to our credit reporting 




379 See Patricia Tjaden, Defining and Measuring Violence Against Women: Background, Issues, and 
Recommendations, 22 STAT. J. UN 217, 218 (2005) (explaining shifts in the “violence against women 
paradigm”). 
380 Id. 
381 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (“[T]he husband and wife 
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during 
the marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.”); see also 
Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, 
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 10 (1999) (tracing state approval of 
domestic violence back to British common law, through the American colonial period, and into the 
twentieth century). 
382 Equifax, the oldest of the three major credit bureaus, began in 1899, but the other two did 
not emerge until 1968 (TransUnion) and 1980 (Experian). See Jim Wang, History of Credit Bureaus: 
Equifax, Experian, TransUnion & Innovis, BARGAINEERING, http://www.bargaineering.com/ 
articles/history-of-credit-bureaus-equifax-experian-transunion-innovis.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012). Credit reporting did not become widespread until the 1990s. Hendricks, supra note 116, at 
42. 
